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A "FAUSTIAN PACT"?1 NATIVE ADVERTISING
AND THE FUTURE OF THE PRESS
Lili Levi*
As technology undermines the economic model supporting the traditional press,
news organizations are succumbing to the siren call of "native advertising"-a
new marketing technique for unobtrusively integrating paid advertising into
editorial content. Brands are increasingly turning to native ads to preempt
consumers' well-documented ad avoidance. Although the native advertising model
debuted on digital-native news sites, it is now ubiquitous in elite legacy media s
well. Everyone knew "native" had arrived for good when the venerable New York
Times not only introduced its online "Paid Post," but incorporated sponsored
content in its print editions, and even hired an in-house branded content
production team to conceive and execute the embedded ads on behalf of
advertisers. Because such integrated advertising must inevitably flirt with disguise
and deception, administrative and scholarly attention has principally addressed it
through a consumer protection lens. Yet this conventional frame ignores the more
insidious hazards of this transformational development. Apart from confusing at
least some consumers, the turn to native ads will profoundly hobble the press in
the exercise of its democratic role, and will invite recalibration of whatever
privileged constitutional status it still has. These effects are particularly troubling
in an age when increases in global state power and new forms of censorship call
1. Joe Pompeo, 'Wall Street Journal' Editor Gerard Baker Decries Native
Advertising as a 'Faustian Pact,' POLITICOMEDIA (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/media/2013/09/8534047/wall-street-journal-editor-
gerard-baker-decries-native-advertising-fau (quoting Wall Street Journal Editor's warning
about some native ad deals between advertisers and news publishers). 'Faustian pact' refers
to selling one's soul to the devil. See Faustian, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed.),
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american-english/Faustian (last visited
July 30, 2015).
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Ellen Goodman, Ron
Krotoszynski, Steve Schnably, Ralph Shalom, and Howard Wasserman deserve all my
thanks for particularly helpful suggestions. I am grateful as well to Caroline Corbin,
Michele DeStefano, Pat Gudridge, Steve Halpert, Joel Kaiman, Lyrissa Lidsky, Felix
Mormann, Mili Mormann, Anne Louise Oates, Peggy Radin, and Sylvia Shapiro for very
valuable conversations and comments. Thanks are also due to Mitchell Retelny and Anne
Meyers for able research assistance at the last minute. All remaining errors are, regretfully,
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for a powerful, independent, and fearless press. Still, because native advertising is
here to stay, admittedly imperfect responses must be explored. In that spirit, this
Article proposes three solutions: (1) "voice priming": designing sponsorship
disclosure at the per-ad level in close alignment with results of rigorous empirical
research regarding consumers' cognitive and perceptual responses to labeling; (2)
"surveillance-enabling": adopting additional, corporate-level disclosure designed
to highlight advertiser identity and spending in order to aid public oversight over
the editorial independence of news organizations; and (3) "collective standard-
setting": addressing structural impediments to collective action by news
organizations to promote collective strategies for effective self-regulation in the
deployment of native advertising. These solutions seek to promote a diverse Fourth
Estate that sees itself as charged with engaging in accountability journalism.
Although it is a closer question with respect to some kinds of native advertising,
sponsorship disclosure requirements are unlikely to run afoul of the First
Amendment. If they are deemed to do so, however, what might be seen as a free
speech "victory" would be Pyrrhic indeed-ironically serving as the nail in the
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INTRODUCTION
The buzzwords "native advertising," "branded content," "sponsored
content," and "content marketing" are now all the rage in marketing circles.2 They
refer to advertisements that are seamlessly integrated into editorial content, and are
therefore "native" to their digital context. Such commercials are said to be far
more effective than the banner ads that represented the initial transition from print
to digital advertising.3 Companies find them desirable because, instead of irritating
readers and triggering ad avoidance, they engage consumer interest by providing
valued content and an integrated digital experience.4 According to one study by
the Online Publishers Association, almost 75% of the Association's members now
use native advertising.
2. See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, Ad-Sponsored Editorial Content Draws Regulator's
Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, at B4 (quoting a marketing strategy director's view that
native advertising is "the shiny new object of the advertising world."); see also Cooper
Smith, Native Ads Will Be the Centerpiece of All Social Media Advertising in the Near
Future, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/native-mobile-ads-
dominate-social-media-2013-11; Jeff Sonderman & Millie Tran, Understanding the Rise of
Sponsored Content, AM. PRESS INST. (Nov. 13, 2013, 7:22 PM),
http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/white-papers/understanding-
rise-sponsored-content/.
3. See, e.g., Alex Attinger, Why Native Advertising Is Here to Stay - But It
Must Be Fully Transparent, THE GUARDIAN - MEDIA NETWORK BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014,
5:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-
blog/2014/mar/10/native-advertising-engage-consumers-transparent; Margaret Sullivan,
Pledging Clarity, The Times Plunges Into Native Advertising, N.Y. TIMES: PUB. EDITOR'S
J. (Dec. 19, 2013, 4:17 PM), http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/pledging-
clarity-the-times-plunges-into-native-advertising/; Danny Wong, 11 Surprising Stats That
Demonstrate Native Advertising's Value to Marketers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 6, 2014,
5:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danny-wong/1 -surprising-stats-that-
b_5267424.html.
4. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Fall of the Banner Ad: The Monster That
Swallowed the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at Al; FED. TRADE COMM'N, Blurred Lines:
Advertising or Content? - An FTC Workshop on Native Advertising, 1, 81-82 (2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-events/171321/final-transcript_1.pdf
[hereinafter Blurred Lines Workshop].
5. Online Publishers Ass'n, Premium Content Brands Are Native Naturals (July
10, 2013), http://digitalcontentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/2.pdf; see also You
Mon Tsang, The FTC May Bark at Native Ads, but It Won't Bite, VENTUREBEAT (Feb. 20,
2014, 3:30 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/02/20/the-ftc-may-bark-at-native-ads-but-it-
wont-bite/. A report for Journalism.org noted in 2014 that the native advertising market was
projected to reach $4.6 billion by 2017. Jesse Holcomb & Amy Mitchell, A Deeper Look at
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What is particularly new and notable today is that, in addition to their
ubiquity in entertainment programming and product placement, native ads
increasingly appear in the news context of both legacy and web-native news
media. Native advertising has emerged, enthusiasts say, as the next viable
economic alternative for press survival in the digital news space. 6 From
BuzzFeed's sponsored listicles to the New York Times' "Paid Post," the news space
is awash with a variety of such native content.7 More striking yet is the fact that
these ads are increasingly produced not by brands or their advertising agencies, but
by the news organizations themselves on behalf of advertisers. Media companies
even court advertisers by promising that their "branded content" studios will offer
marketers "access to . . . editorial assets" to help brands "deliver compelling
content."'
Yet native advertising is controversial.9 Lowbrow gossip website Gawker
brought the issue to the fore when it revealed that highbrow magazine The Atlantic
had published a paid Scientology puff-piece that was virtually indistinguishable in
the Digital Advertising Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.journalism.org/2014/03/26/a-deeper-look-at-the-digital-advertising-landscape/
(citing BIA/Kelsey projections); but cf Gee Leung, Native Advertising: With Great Power
Comes Great Responsibility, AGC PARTNERS (Mar. 2015),
http://agcpartners.com/content/uploads/2015/03/AGC-Native-Advertising-Thought-Piece-
March-2015.pdf (projecting $21 billion in 2018); see also Blurred Lines Workshop, supra
note 4, at 132 (remarks of Bob Garfield).
6. See, e.g., Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 83-84; Lucia Moses,
Native Seen as 'Salvation' for Ad Woes, ADWEEK (Sept. 24, 2013, 2:44 PM),
http://www.adweek.com/news/press/native-seen-salvation-advertising-woes-152689. For a
thorough review of the spread of native advertising in online news publications, see Amar
C. Bakshi, Why and How to Regulate Native Advertising in Online News Publications, U.
BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS, Winter/Spring 2015, at 7-8.
7. Joshua Benton, Like It or Not, Native Advertising Is Squarely Inside the Big
News Tent, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/09/like-it-or-not-native-advertising-is-squarely-inside-the-
big-news-tent/. While traditional news organizations debuted native ads online, they have
crossed over into print as well. See Lucia Moses, The NY Times Runs Its First Print Native
Ad, DIGIDAY (Nov. 19, 2014), http://digiday.com/publishers/new-advertorial-ny-times-runs-
first-print-native-ad/. Forbes' February 2015 issue notably referenced, for the first time on
the cover, a native ad for Fidelity to be found in the magazine. See Molly Soat, Forbes'
Native Ad Cover Sparks Ethics Discussion, MARKETING NEWS WKLY. (Feb. 24, 2015),
https://www.ama.org/publications/eNewsletters/Marketing-News-Weekly/Pages/forbes-
native-ad.aspx.
8. See Press Release, Cond6 Nast, New Branded Content Studio 23 Stories by
Cond6 Nast Debuts (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.condenast.com/press/press-releases/2015/
01/26/new-branded-content-studio-23-stories-conde-nast-debut; see also Damaris Colhoun,
Disguising Ads as Stories, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb. 10, 2015,
http://www.cjr.org/behind-the-news/sponsored-content.php.
9. For recent journalistic critiques, see, e.g., Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra
note 8; Michael Meyer, Should Journalism Worry About Content Marketing?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Oct. 29, 2014,
http://www.cjr.org/innovations/should-journalism worry-about.php.
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style from the magazine's traditional editorial content. 10 Television comedian John
Oliver was so offended that he took the practice of native advertising to task on
late night television last year." Ambivalent advertisers worry about whether their
customers will be alienated by hidden sponsorship. 12 Regulators express concern
about the potential for consumer deception, and stakeholders bicker over adopting
and enforcing appropriate consumer-oriented transparency and labeling
requirements. 13
The conventional consumer protection frame, however, backgrounds the
more insidious hazards posed by the kudzu-like dispersion of native advertising in
the news space. Native advertising will likely prove a Faustian bargain for the
press. Without entrepreneurial marketing, the financial sustainability of much of
the traditional American press may be at risk.14 But the economic fix offered by
native advertising may undercut the very journalism likely to promote democracy
most robustly. The catastrophic result: news organizations with crippled
reputations in their core functions, and unable to tap the commercial well for
funding.
10. See, e.g., Taylor Berman, The Atlantic Is Now Publishing Bizarre, Blatant
Scientology Propaganda as 'Sponsored Content,' GAWKER (Jan. 14, 2013, 9:22 PM),
http://www.gawker.com/5975981/the-atlantic-is-now-publishing-bizarre-blatant-
scientology-propaganda-as-sponsored-content; Jim Edwards, Here's the Scientology
'Sponsored Content' Story That The Atlantic Doesn't Want You to See, Bus. INSIDER (Jan.
15, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-the-scientology-sponsored-content-story-
that-the-atlantic-doesnt-want-you-to-see-2013-1; see also SPONSORED: The Taliban Is a
Vibrant and Thriving Political Movement, THE ONION (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.theonion.com/articles/sponsored-the-taliban-is-a-vibrant-and-thriving-po,30910/
(satirizing The Atlantic's Scientology piece).
11. See, e.g., Kevin O'Keeffe, John Oliver Takes on Native Advertising,
Journalism's Raisin Cookie, THE WIRE (Aug. 4, 2014, 10:07 AM),
http://www.thewire.com/entertainment/2014/08/john-oliver-takes-on-native-advertising-
journalisms-raisin-cookie/375513/; Felix Gillette, Native-Ad Experts Critique John Oliver's
Harsh Critique of Native Advertising, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-05/ad-industry-execs-weigh-in-on-john-
olivers-native-advertising-takedown.
12. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 74; see also Michelle Manafy,
Trust Me: Content Marketing Is Risky Business, INC. (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://www.inc.com/michelle-manafy/trust-me-content-marketing-is-risky-business.html.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 70-80.
14. See, e.g., Rick Edmonds et al., Newspapers: Stabilizing, but Still Threatened,
PEW RES. CTR.'S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE (July 18, 2013),
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2013/newspapers-stabilizing-but-still-threatened/; David
Lieberman, Newspaper Closings Raise Fears About Industry, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2009,
2:27 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/media/2009-03-17-newspapers-
downturn_N.htm; Joe Pompeo, The U.S. Has Lost More Than 166 Print Newspapers Since
2008, Bus. INSIDER (July 6, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-has-
lost-more-than-166-print-newspapers-since-2008-2010-7; FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, The
Information Needs of Communities: The Changing Media Landscape in a Broadband Age
36-43 (2011), http://www.hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-307406A1.pdf
(explaining the financial pressure resulting from public corporate ownership of news
organizations and extensive debt service obligations).
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First, native advertising promises to undermine editorial independence
and thus weaken journalism's role in holding governmental and private power
accountable. By normalizing "corporatized news,"15 it does so more dramatically
than its predecessors in "stealth" 1 6 advertising. Because of the recent power shift
between news organizations and advertisers and the rise of "brand newsrooms,"17
the purported efficacy of native advertising, and the structural innovations through
which much native advertising is produced by news organizations in-house, it is
reasonable to expect that advertisers' interests will have an increased impact on the
editorial side of the commercial press. When both the structure and character of
advertising undermine the traditional divide between commercial and editorial
content, there are increased risks of the selection and coverage of news being
especially skewed by the interests of commercial clients. The threat is particularly
salient when one looks at native advertising as a part of a broader digital news
ecosystem. Thus, native advertising has significant repercussions for public
discourse and for the democratic role of the media."
Second, even if only some news organizations use native advertising,
such ads may well engender distrust of the press as a whole and undermine its
power as an institution. This in turn presents a particular danger today because the
institutional power of the press already appears diminished from the "golden age"
of journalism.19 It is particularly regrettable when increases in global state power
20and new forms of censorship make a powerful and independent press institution
21acting in the public interest most necessary.
Third, an expansion of native advertising could jeopardize the press's
22privileged position under the First Amendment. This is true even if a successful
15. Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8.
16. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 83-94 (2006) (describing the practice).
17. See Meyer, supra note 9.
18. For important arguments about the democratic harms associated with
advertising (and hidden advertising), see, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A
DEMOCRATIC PRESS (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 1994); Goodman, Stealth Marketing,
supra note 16; Bakshi, supra note 6, at 6 (discussing "serious concerns about journalistic
integrity and advertiser influence in 21' Century online news publications").
19. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429,
506-09 (2002); Jane Kirtley, Summit Report: Freedom of the Press in the Twenty-First
Century-an Agenda for Thought and Action, 19 COMM. L. & POL'Y 109, 110-11 (2014);
Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1553-55 (2012). For
discussions of what has been called the "golden age" of journalism, see, e.g., Lyrissa
Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819 (2012); RonNell Andersen
Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV.
253 (2014).
20. See Jack Balkin, Old School/New School Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2306-24 (2014) (identifying a new front in censorship).
21. The revelations of massive-scale spying by the NSA and other countries' spy
agencies support this proposition. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA
Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June
7, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
22. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 19; Lidsky, supra note 19.
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argument could be made that regulation of at least some kinds of native ads would
face constitutional hurdles under current advertising-protective Supreme Court
precedent. Since the mid-twentieth century, constitutional rhetoric has
characterized the press differently from other commercial speakers even though
commercial news organizations are for-profit businesses. Once the line between
ads and editorial content has been definitively crossed, however, a court seeking to
recalibrate the constitutional status of the press could well use that development as
a rationalization for doing so. There are indications that the Roberts Court may be
23just such a Court.
Having identified the triad of threats posed by the spread of native
advertising into journalism, and proceeding from the assumption that the Hobson's
choice faced by the press offers no perfect solution, the Article proposes three
alternatives for exploration.
To the extent that they involve regulation, the Article argues that such
solutions would likely pass muster under current First Amendment doctrine.24 This
is particularly true if traditional, pre-Roberts-Court commercial speech doctrine is
applied. The constitutional question is somewhat complicated, however, by the
Roberts Court's apparent embrace of corporate speech and by nontrivial arguments
distinguishing native advertising from classic commercial speech. Should
advertisers and news publishers be successful in resisting regulation as a result of
those developments, however, such a free-speech victory would be Pyrrhic
indeed-gaining protection for native advertisements at the cost of reducing
constitutional status for the press. Given the conflicting interests of advertisers and
news organizations in judicially testing the constitutionality of disclosure
regulations, adopting effective self-regulation by collective press industry buy-in
would be the preferable alternative.
In the first proposal, the Article recommends empirically-grounded
11 25"voice priming" disclosure for native advertising. Such disclosure would consist
of labeling designed to enable consumers to distinguish native advertising from
news and to identify its sponsors at the ad level. "Voice priming" disclosure is less
subject to the failures of mandated information disclosure r gimes targeted by
today's "anti-disclosurism"26 Movement.27
Second, the Article proposes linking disclosure to what makes native
advertising a meta-threat to expressive values and quality journalism. In contrast
with labeling regimes designed to enable consumers to distinguish native
23. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 19; see generally AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BUBBLE (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 2015) (arguing that the press's increasing
tabloidization is leading to a retrenchment in press-protective judicial attitudes).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 174-90.
25. Cf DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOw 52-58 (2011)
(describing priming effects).
26. Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains
TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (2015) (so characterizing the views of disclosure-
skeptics Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider in a review of their book More Than You
Wanted to Know).
27. See infra Section VI.A.
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advertising at the ad level, this meta-disclosure approach is designed to support
oversight over editorial independence. Two examples of this kind of disclosure are
offered-the first entails disclosure of the identities (and industries) of news
organizations' major advertisers, as well as the percentage of the news outlets' ad-
based revenues attributable to those advertisers. The second calls for identification
of ad content that was produced in-house by news organization personnel and/or
branded content teams employed by the publisher, and disclosure of the
relationships between those t ams and the editorial side of the organization.
Third, the Article presents the case for more effective self-regulation and
industry discipline through collective action. Native advertising cannot realistically
be eliminated. The question is what can be done to constrain its worst effects.
Collective action by at least the mainstream news organizations might be a way
forward. Despite the serious structural constraints on such collective action, it is
more likely to be accomplished to good (if not perfect) effect if both brands and
news organizations are brought to perceive that the adoption of reasonable checks
on native advertising is desirable in their self-interest. It is possible to devise
strategies to enhance the likelihood of such collective self-regulation.
Part I of the Article describes the range of native ads and maps their
adoption in both digital and mainstream print news publishing settings. Next, Part
II explains the regulatory context, focusing on FTC and FCC regulations, as well
as advertising industry self-regulation. Part III describes and assesses the current
deception- and labeling-focused approach to regulation of native advertising. Part
IV turns to the expressive threats posed by native advertising. Section IV.A
examines the hazards to editorial independence and democracy-promoting
journalism, particularly when seen in concert with other changes to the digital
news landscape. Section IV.B shows how native advertising threatens the
legitimacy and power of the institutional press as a whole. Part V discusses the
constitutional questions raised by native advertising regulation and explains how
native advertising could emerge as the hook on which a reevaluation of the
constitutional status of the press can be hung. Lastly, to mitigate the intractable
problem posed by the need for commercial funding of accountability journalism
today, Part VI makes two different transparency proposals, along with
recommending strategies to induce better self-regulation.
I. THE RISE AND DIFFUSION OF NATIVE ADVERTISING
Much has been written about the twentieth century model of commercial
funding for newspaperS28 and its decline in the digital news context.29 Given the
collapse of the traditional model of newspaper advertising,30 and the failures of the
28. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 18; Waldman, supra note 15; JEFF KAYE &
STEPHEN QUINN, FUNDING JOURNALISM IN THE DIGITAL AGE: BUSINESS MODELS,
STRATEGIES, ISSUES AND TRENDS 5-7 (2010).
29. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 18; FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, supra note 14;
Paul Starr, Goodbye to the Age of Newspapers (Hello to a New Era of Corruption), NEW
REPUBLIC (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/goodbye-the-age-
newspapers-hello-new-era-corruption.
30. See, e.g., Steven Waldman, The Backstory on Native Advertising, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Aug. 6, 2014,
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31first generation of digital advertising, it is attractive to frame native advertising
32as the economic savior of news media going forward.
A. What Is Native Advertising?
Native advertising is consistently described as lacking a unitary and clear
definition. Broadly speaking, however, the term refers to the integration of
advertisements into the editorial content of websites, newspapers, or magazines. 34
Native advertising entails "a publisher placing paid advertising content, written
either in collaboration with the advertiser or directly by the advertiser, on its site in
such a way that it mimics editorial content." According to the Interactive
Advertising Bureau ("IAB"), a major online advertising self-regulatory group,
native ads are "paid ads that are so cohesive with the page content, assimilated into
the design, and consistent with the platform that the viewer simply feels that they
belong."36
One of the definitional difficulties is due to the fact that there are multiple
types of-and perspectives from which to describe-native ads.3 7 A granular look
http://www.cjr.org/the-audit/thebackstory-on-native-advert.php; Blurred Lines
Workshop, supra note 4, at 35-36.
31. See, e.g., David Anderson, Hidden Agendas, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2
(2006); Manjoo, supra note 4 (discussing the ineffective, confusing, irritating, and skewing
character of banner ads).
32. See, e.g., Jason del Rey, Native Advertising: Media Savior or Just the New
Custom Campaign?, ADVERT. AGE (Oct. 29, 2012), http://adage.com/article/digital/native-
advertising-media-savior-custom-campaign/238010/.
33. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 297 (remarks of Jessica Rich,
director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection); Mitch Joel, We Need a Better Definition of
"Native Advertising", HARV. Bus. REV. (Feb. 13, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/02/we-need-
a-better-definition-of!; see also Fernando A. Bohorquez, Jr. & Alan M. Pate, All Native
Advertising Is Not Equal: Why that Matters Under the First Amendment and Why It Should
Matter to the FTC, IMEDIA CONNECTION: IMEDIA CONNECTION BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014, 9:00
AM), http://blogs.imediaconnection.com/blog/2014/09/02/all-native-advertising/
(describing the definition of native advertising as "elusive"); see also infra text
accompanying notes 195-215 (discussing the status of such ads as commercial speech).
34. See Attinger, supra note 3 (describing the goal of native ads to "blend" ads
and editorial content "into a coherent entity where the relevancy ... is seamless"); Tom
Kutsch, The Blurred Lines of Native Advertising, AL JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 8, 2014, 11:45
PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/8/the-blurred-
linesofanativeaadvertising.html.
35. Holcomb & Mitchell, supra note 5.
36. INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, NATIVE ADVERTISING PLAYBOOK 3
(2013), http://www.iab.net/nativeadvertising [hereinafter NATIVE ADVERTISING PLAYBOOK]
(stating the self-regulatory guidelines by the IAB and describing the landscape and
recommending disclosure principles for native ads).
37. Holcomb & Mitchell, supra note 5. The slides generated for the Blurred
Lines Workshop, supra note 4, provide some visual examples of the variety of native ads
and are available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2013/12/blurred-
lines-advertising-or-content-ftc-workshop-native (follow "Event Materials" hyperlink). For
other good collections, see, e.g., Demian Farnworth, 12 Examples of Native Ads and Why
They Work, COPYBLOGGER, http://www.copyblogger.com/examples-of-native-ads/ (last
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at the native advertising landscape reveals differences as to production, character,
and placement.38 Native advertising is produced by the brands themselves or their
advertising agencies, by the publishers' own writers at the request of the brands,
and by the publishers in arranging for sponsorship. From the point of view of
placement-how the advertisements are integrated into the media offerings-a
review of native ads reveals a variety of formats as well.39 Some publishers even
fully integrate the sponsored content, placing it within the body of a news story.4 0
Native advertising formats also differ, with some native ads being part of broader
campaigns and others standing alone.41 Finally, native advertising is further
propagated and amplified on the web by being posted to publishers' and brands'
42social media pages.
Advertisers increasingly gravitate toward native ads, because they have
emerged as viable ways to overcome ad "blindness"-consumer distaste for
intrusive, annoying, and distracting advertising.4 3
visited July 30, 2015); Jon Gregoire, Native Advertising Examples and Publishers, CPC
STRATEGY BLOG (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.cpcstrategy.com/blog/2013/12/native-
advertising-examples/; James O'Brien, 4 Native Ads the Media's Talking About,
MASHABLE (Sept. 30, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/09/30/native-ad-campaigns/.
From the production side, there appear to be at least three different models of
native advertising. See Dena Levitz, The Push to Define, Guide "Native Advertising"
Intensifies, MEDIASHIFT (Oct. 4, 2013), http://mediashift.org/2013/10/the-challenge-of-
defining-coming-up-with-a-standard-for-native-advertising/ (discussing the BuzzFeed
approach, the underwritten model, and the Forbes approach).
38. The IAB's native-identifying factors include: form, function, integration,
buying and targeting, measurement, and disclosure. Native Advertising Playbook, supra
note 36, at 6; see also Robert A. Gottfried, Note, Six Ways this Article Is Most Definitely
Not an Ad: Deceptive Marketing and the Need for Clearly-Defined Disclosure Rules in
Online Native Advertisements, 27 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 399, 402-03 (2015)
(describing IAB categories).
39. See Native Advertising Playbook, supra note 36, at 4-5 (breaking down
native advertising into six categories: (1) in-feed units; (2) paid search units; (3)
recommendation widgets; (4) promoted listings; (5) in-ad with native element units; and (6)
"custom/can't be contained"); see also Bohorquez & Pate, supra note 33, at 7-13 (providing
useful elaborations of the various types of native ads); Gottfried, supra note 38, at 401-03
(same).
40. Recently, one publisher "has [even] begun breaking up articles by placing
advertising content in the middle of them" and even allowing the format of the inserted
content to vary "based on the needs of the advertiser." Jack Marshall, About.com Adds Its
Own Twist to "Native Advertising," WALL ST. J.: CMo TODAY (Sept. 3, 2014, 2:05 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/09/03/about-com-adds-its-own-twist-to-native-advertising/.
41. See, e.g., Rick Edmonds, As the New York Times Debuts Its Template for
Native Ads, Will Other Newspapers Follow?, POYNTER (Feb. 5, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/237061/as-the-new-york-times-debuts-its-
template-for-native-ads-will-other-newspapers-follow/ (describing New York Times' foray
into native ads with a campaign by Dell consisting of "a whole series of loosely related
articles that touch on how the company defines itself and the services it offers").
42. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 48-53.
43. See, e.g., Leung, supra note 5, at 2, 4 (describing "banner blindness" and the
advantages of native ads for advertisers); Attinger, supra note 3 (discussing the perception
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B. The New Frontier: Mainstreaming Native Advertising in News Venues
One of the most noteworthy recent developments is that news
organizations have unashamedly adopted native advertising to help address the
misfit of the traditional media-advertising model with digital distribution-and
have even brought native advertising production in-house. The development is
important because of the modern significance of the separation of news and
advertising, both in institutional structure and as a key component of journalism
ethics.
Both digital-native news outlets and traditional news organizations have
welcomed with open arms the revenues promised by native advertising. Several
digital news organizations-BuzzFeed, The Huffington Post, Mashable, and
Gawker-have adopted native advertising as a central aspect of their financial
strategies. Traditional, elite print news organizations as well have begun to
incorporate native advertising, although more slowly. For example, The Guardian
launched a "branded content and innovation agency" and a partnership with the
company Unilever.4 6 The New York Times, Time, the Washington Post, Harpers,
The Atlantic, and The Guardian all now use native advertising.47 Similarly, the
Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times offer a version of sponsored content
under the label "brand publishing."4 8
Moreover, many news organizations-both legacy and digital natives-
are partnering with brands to produce native advertising. In contrast to past
practice, in which newspapers simply reviewed and distributed commercial
product provided by advertisers, news outlets are increasingly utilizing their own
in-house teams to produce content for advertisers.49 The Guardian announced that
that native ads are considered more appealing to consumers than traditional and/or banner
advertising online); Sonderman & Tran, supra note 2 (same).
44. This separation is often colloquially referred to as the "church-state
distinction" or "the wall of separation." See, e.g., Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at
32 (remarks of Nicholas Lemann); see also infra Section IV.A.
45. Holcomb & Mitchell, supra note 5 (noting that BuzzFeed announced
profitability in 2013 based "almost exclusively" on native ads). Native ads also helped drive
The Atlantic's digital revenue from less than 10% in 2006 to 60% in 2013.
46. See Kutsch, supra note 34; Press Release, The Guardian News and Media
Press Off., Guardian Labs Officially Launches with Unilever Sustainable Living Partnership
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/gnm-press-office/guardian-launches-
guardian-labs-with-unilever-partnership [hereinafter Guardian Press Release].
47. Kutsch, supra note 34. Recently, the New Republic has joined the fold. See
Lukas I. Alpert, New Republic to Start Producing Content for Advertisers, WALL ST. J.:
CMo TODAY (Mar. 19, 2015, 3:33 PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/cmo/2015/03/19/new-
republic-to-start-producing-content-for-advertisers/.
48. Edmonds, supra note 41; see also GAJDA, supra note 23, at 119-20
(describing Fortune and Forbes' forays into sponsored content). Even nonprofit news
organizations are experimenting in this area. See, e.g., Luis Gomez, A Nonprofit News
Approach to Native Advertising, JOURNO.Biz (June 16, 2014),
http://journo.biz/2014/06/16/a-nonprofit-news-approach-to-native-advertising/.
49. The New York Times, BuzzFeed, Forbes, and The Atlantic's Quartz have
created in-house "content studios" to produce their native ad posts. See Edmonds, supra
note 41; see also Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8; Meyer, supra note 9; Sullivan,
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its partnership with Unilever would lead to the creation of an in-house team of 133
people that would "tap into the Guardian's top class editorial, creativity and digital
innovation" to help Unilever and other brands "tell their story."5 0 The New York
Times announced that content for Dell, which was the New York Times' first major
native advertising move, would be produced by employees from the New York
51Times' advertising division and paid freelancers. Most unusually, some of these
news organizations even involve their editorial side in the production of native
52advertising.
News content and advertising are being intermingled in different ways as
well, as part of new developments in the attempt to monetize news. Some
traditional news organizations are offering their content to advertisers for
downstream commercial use. The Wall Street Journal and The Dallas Morning
News, for example, are effectively leasing their own archived stories for
advertising brands to use on their own sites.
All this is a marked change from past practice. Although some early radio
news programming was sponsored by brands, the use of sponsored content in news
reporting was uncommon for most of the twentieth century. A media,
administrative, and public fracas ensued when, in 2004, the New York Times broke
a story that local television stations had broadcast video news releases ("VNR") in
their news programs without disclosing the involvement of the government in their
production. In contrast to the shame-faced attitude of broadcast news
supra note 4. Cond6 Nast launched 23 Stories in January 2015. Colhoun, Disguising Ads,
supra note 8.
50. Guardian Press Release, supra note 46; see also Kutsch, supra note 34.
51. See Kutsch, supra note 34; Michael Sebastian, Five Things to Know About
the New York Times' New Native Ads, ADVERT. AGE (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://adage.com/article/media/york-times-debuts-native-ad-units-del/290973/.
52. Cond6 Nast, for example, announced that its magazine editors would "work
directly with marketers to produce branded content." Steven Perlberg, Condt Nast Unveils
Branded Content Shop Powered by Editors, WALL ST. J.: CMO TODAY (Jan. 26, 2015,
2:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2015/01/26/23-stories-conde-nast-branded-content/.
Similarly, staffers at DailyMail.com also "work on both news reports and branded content."
Id.; see also Claire Lorell, Inside Hearst's Native Ad Strategy, DIGIDAY (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://digiday.com/publishers/hearst-magazine-native-advertising/ (identifying Hearst as
well).
53. Edmonds, supra note 41. See also GAJDA, supra note 23, at 119-20
(describing Fortune-branded editorial content for marketers to distribute on their platforms).
54. See Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials
in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED.
CoMM. L.J. 329, 338-44 (2004) (noting that some news programming was sponsored). In
any event, what it meant at the time for news programs to have brand sponsorship is not
entirely clear. Moreover, sponsored news programming was controversial enough to be
terminated as a practice. Id.; see also infra note 121.
55. See Robert Pear, U.S. Videos, for TV News, Come Under Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al; Frank Ahrens, FCC Queries TV Stations on Video News
Releases, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081401006.html; Brooks Boliek, Adelstein to FCC:
Police VNR Use, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Nov. 15, 2006, 4:00 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/adelstein-fcc-police-vnr-use-143251; see also
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organizations in response to revelations of their inclusion of VNRs in their news
programs5 6-and, indeed, what appears to be the comparatively infrequent use of
such sponsored new 5 7-news organizations today appear to be openly embracing
native advertising as their economic holy grail to make up for years of declining
advertising revenue. This transition of native ads from the "new" media to the
traditional mainstream media indicates that the news industry sees native ads as
losing any stigma they may have carried in the past.
II. THE REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Newspapers have relied on advertising in different ways and to different
degrees over the past 150 years.59 After early skirmishes, broadcasting in the
United States also developed as a largely commercial medium reliant on
advertising. 60 In response, advertising has been subject to state and federal
regulation since the early days. Constitutionally, regulation of advertising has been
reviewed not under traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny, but pursuant o the
Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the New Battle Over the Regulation of Video
News Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361 (2008); Goodman, supra note 16, at 90,
92; Peter Menell, 2014: Brand Totalitarianism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 787, 802-03
(2014); Jeffrey Peabody, Note, When the Flock Ignores the Shepherd - Corralling the
Undisclosed Use of Video News Releases, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 577, 581-82 (2008).
56. Perhaps in order to stave off regulation, the National Association of
Broadcast Communicators produced a Membership Code addressing the use of VNRs. See
Peabody, supra note 55, at 583-84 nn.28-35 and sources cited therein.
57. In 2006, the Center for Media & Democracy issued a report identifying 77
television stations airing 36 video news releases in their news programming. See Diane
Farsetta & Daniel Price, Still Not the News: Stations Overwhelmingly Fail to Disclose
VNRs, PR WATCH (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.prwatch.org/fakenews2/execsummary.
While this is a notable number of stations, it should be seen in the broader context of the
thousands of U.S. broadcasting licenses. But see Calvert, supra note 55, at 370 (citing
expansion of VNR production industry); Menell, supra note 55, at 802-03 (using CMD data
to indicate failure of industry codes of conduct).
58. See Gavin O'Malley, Native Advertising Predicted to Dominate Digital in
2014, MEDIAPOST MOBILE MARKETING DAILY (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:19 PM),
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/217000/native-advertising-predicted-to-
dominate-digital-i.html ("Say goodbye to the stigma associated with native advertising.");
see also Margaret Sullivan, Opinion, Dean Baquet's "Charting the Future" Note to Times
Staff, N.Y. TIMES PUB. EDITOR'S J. (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/dean-baquets-charting-the-future-note-to-
times-staff/ ("I'm working with the business side to see if there are steps we can take to
attract more ads without compromising the line between news and advertising. For instance,
can an advertiser sponsor a regular feature? Yes, so long as it does not make readers
question our objectivity. This is tricky territory, but some of the best news organizations in
the world have already navigated it.").
59. See generally BAKER, supra note 18.
60. See, e.g., John Nichols & Robert W. McChesney, The Death and Life of
Great American Newspapers, NATION, Apr. 6, 2009, at 11-20. The early history of radio
reflects a distaste for advertising. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE
CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 5 (1993); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra
note 54.
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less stringent judicial review of the commercial speech doctrine since the 1970s.1
62Perhaps because of changing social norms with respect to advertising, much of
the development in this area has been left up to administrative regulation and
industry self-regulation. The federal regulation of advertising has largely been
undertaken under the auspices of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). 63
A. Administrative Regulation
Statutes prohibit false and deceptive advertising and seek to ensure that
adequate sponsorship information is provided to the public. 6 The Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act") authorizes the FTC to stop "unfair methods of
competition,"6 5 and prohibits false advertising. On the broadcast front, Congress
passed sponsorship disclosure requirements with regard to paid content-a regime
still operative today.67 Both the FTC68 and the FCC 69 have adopted regulations in
the exercise of their regulatory jurisdiction over advertising.
61. See infra Section V.A.
62. As Professor Anderson has noted, social responses to commercialization
have shifted significantly since the early twentieth century. Anderson, supra note 31. To the
extent that the audience allows itself to find even commercially sponsored content desirable
if it is interesting and fits the reader's interests, incentives increase for brands to provide
such editorial content.
63. Other federal agencies, such as the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA"),
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, have jurisdiction over advertising as well. This Article will only discuss FTC and
FCC regulation.
64. For example, since the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912, newspapers
wishing to take advantage of favorable postage rates were required to distinguish paid
content as advertisements. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 54, at 334-35. The
disclosure requirement of the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912 was upheld in Lewis Publ'g
Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). Newspaper attempts to end-run disclosure obligations
by distributing special pages on which a business buying an ad "got a small story lauding
the business and its owner" backfired. Anderson, supra note 31, at 1.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2012); see also FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, appended
to International Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1070 (1984).
67. Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 19 (repealed 1934); Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 507 (2014).
68. 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0, 255.1, 255.5 (2015). The FTC first adopted endorsement
guidelines for bloggers in 2009. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124 (Dec. 1, 2009) (mandating disclosure
when bloggers have been paid or given something of value to tout a product); see also FED.
TRADE COMM'N, .COM DISCLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES IN DIGITAL
ADVERTISING (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-
staff-revises-online-advertising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf
(offering practical tips for effective disclosures in digital/online advertising); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, THE FTC ENDORSEMENT GUIDES: WHAT PEOPLE ARE ASKING (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-
people-are-asking?hc_1ocation=ufi (providing disclosure guidance in connection with
common social media endorsement scenarios).
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1. "Blurred Lines: Advertising or Content?"-The FTC's Recent Workshop on
Native Advertising
Despite predecessor examples of hidden advertising, the FTC and the
advertising industry see the phenomenon of native advertising as a particularly
new and disruptive version of hidden sponsorship. As a result, the FTC convened a
workshop in December 2013 to explore native advertising. 71 The goal of the
workshop was to prompt a discussion among industry stakeholders in order to help
the FTC determine whether there was a need for additional guidance and/or
regulation of labeling7 2 disclosure by the agency.
Having begun by sketching the history of FTC regulation of deceptive
advertising,7 4 the workshop discussion then focused primarily on the nature and
effectiveness of disclosure requirements. All the industry speakers agreed that
transparency was necessary not only to avoid consumer deception as to whether
content is a paid advertisement, but also in order to protect the publisher's and
brand's credibility with readers. At the same time, there appeared to be
significant lack of consensus among the participants over (1) what kind of
sponsored content should be considered an advertisement subject to disclosure
requirements, 76 and (2) how to operationalize the notion of transparency
69. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1212, 76.1615 (2015); see generally Kielbowicz & Lawson,
supra note 54 (describing the history of sponsorship identification requirements in broadcast
regulation).
70. The FTC had been "concerned with consumers' ability to distinguish
between paid and editorial content, for many years" and has targeted hidden sponsorship
such as "advertorials ... infomercials, sponsored posts, fake news sites, and paid search."
Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting FTC Chair Ramirez). Indeed, the FTC
has extensive jurisprudence about "masquer-ads," deceptive advertising or advertising
seeking to mislead as to source. Id. at 15.
Similarly, in the broadcast context, the FCC has faced hidden sponsorship
problems in the culturally salient precedents of radio station payola and the television quiz
show scandals. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 54, at 347-55. In recent years,
consumers' ability to fast-forward or otherwise avoid the traditional broadcast commercial
led advertisers increasingly to adopt product placement strategies, particularly in
entertainment programming. In response, the FCC opened a rulemaking docket concerning
embedded advertising and product placement. Sponsorship Identification Rules and
Embedded Advertising, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 Fed.
Reg. 43,194 (July 24, 2008); see also In re Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules,
Public Notice, 40 F.C.C. 141 (1963) (emphasizing that "listeners are entitled to know by
whom they are being persuaded").
71. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4.
72. The term "labeling" was used in the FTC workshop and is used here to refer
to any method both words and visuals-used to distinguish ads from editorial content.
73. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 299.
74. Id. at 11-24.
75. See, e.g., id. at 54-55, 74, 78.
76. Thus, the workshop revealed a fundamental theoretical split among the
panelists on the following question: should the fact that an advertiser paid for content
necessarily make that content an advertisement subject to disclosure, or should it depend on
context? See, e.g., id. at 277. Some speakers emphasized that paid placements by brands
should not be deemed to be advertising subject to disclosure requirements under the FTC
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effectively, even when participants agreed that disclosure would be warranted. One
of the points of agreement was the difficulty of generalizing. The industry speakers
appeared to agree that the variety of native ad formats made it unrealistic to craft
single, one-size-fits-all labeling language and requirements. Even within
different categories of native ads, panelists notably differed in their views of the
deceptiveness of the labeling in hypothetical native ads presented to them by
'78workshop organizers.
At the end of the workshop, an FTC representative characterized the day
as having "raised more questions than it answered" for regulators.79 While no
regulatory program has been issued from the Commission in response to the
workshop, intimating that a transparency rulemaking is unlikely in the near future,
FTC enforcement actions based on existing law are to be expected.so
2. The FCC's Open Docket on Sponsorship Identification
Although the FTC has been the most active agency in the area of
advertisement disclosure, the broadcast sponsorship disclosure rules clearly give
the FCC jurisdiction to enforce statutory commercial-sponsorship requirements.
The FCC has had an open docket since 2008 to consider whether it should revise
its sponsorship identification policies in light of the increased use of embedded
advertising.1 Although the Notice of Inquiry in that proceeding does not address
Act if they contained nothing about the manufacturer's products or sought to influence
purchasing decisions. See, e.g., id. at 240-41 (Mudge comments). Other speakers disagreed,
and argued for brightline approaches pursuant to which disclosure would be required
whenever organizations paid for content. See, e.g., id. at 241 (Holt comments).
77. See, e.g., id. at 215 (Zaneis comments). They debated the effectiveness of
"sponsored by," "presented by," "sponsored content," and the use of visual cues
(graphics/color) to differentiate between sponsored and editorial content. Id. at 236-39.
Some of the publisher panelists (such as the Wall Street Journal's Robin Riddle) presented
more granular and differentiated labeling options than the advertiser representatives. Id. at
238-39.
78. Id. at 213-17.
79. Id. at 294 (closing remarks of Mary Engle); see also Katy Bachman, Native
Ad Workshop Leaves FTC Perplexed, Next Enforcement Steps Unclear, ADWEEK (Dec. 4,
2013, 9:09 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/native-ad-workshop-
leaves-ftc-perplexed-154303.
80. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 294; Edmonds, supra note 41
(suggesting likelihood of FTC adjudication and fines for native ads). Admittedly, however,
more FTC activity is not out of the question. Recent scholarship has sought to clarify ways
in which existing regulations could be tailored to cover at least some native advertising. See,
e.g., Bakshi, supra note 6, at 25-30; Gottfried, supra note 38, at 414-17. More to the point,
an FTC staffer recently suggested at an advertising industry conference that the
Commission might issue guidance regarding native advertising in 2015.
Rebecca Tushnet, ANA Conference: Native Advertising, REBECCA TUSHNET's 43(B)LOG
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2015/04/ana-conference-native-advertising.html
(summarizing comments made at the ANA Conference).
81. Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg.
43,194 (July 24, 2008); see also Goodman, supra note 16, at 85; Zahr Said, Embedded
Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 103-04 (2010); Jennifer
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the issue of native advertising as such, the Commission could certainly consider
the matter as part of that proceeding.82 The Commission, however, has not acted
on that docket since 2008, preferring to act on a case-by-case basis to punish
violations of its sponsorship identification rules. 83 The sponsorship-disclosure
regime of the Communications Act is limited to broadcasting and a very small
slice of cable programming, however.
B. Self-Regulation in the Advertising Industry
The FCC 84 and the FTC 85 also have a long history of actively
encouraging industry self-regulation in the advertising arena. Indeed, the best way
to see the FTC's Blurred Lines workshop might be as a signal to the industry to
engage in more effective self-regulation. 86
The advertising industry self-regulates principally through
the Advertising Self-Regulation Council ("ASRC"), 8 7 whose standards for truth
Fujawa, Note, The FCC's Sponsorship Identification Rules: Ineffective Regulation of
Embedded Advertising in Today's Media Marketplace, 64 FED. COMM. L. J. 549 (2012).
82. See Goodman, supra note 16, at 145-51 (proposing expansion of
sponsorship ID requirements).
83. See Jon Markman, FCC Heavies Up on Fine for Multiple Sponsorship ID
Violations, COMMLAWBLOG (Feb. 11, 2014),
http://www.commlawblog.com/2014/02/articles/broadcast/fcc-heavies-up-on-fine-for-
multiple-sponsorship-id-violations/ (linking to $44,000 fine for Chicago AM station airing
paid announcements, designed to sound like a newscast, on behalf of the Workers
Independent News); see also Howard Weiss, Sponsorship ID Police Strike Again,
CoMMLAwBLOG (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.commlawblog.com/2014/12/articles/broadcast/sponsorship-id-police-strike-
again/ (describing consent decree with KTNV-TV over paid but undisclosed "special
report," designed to sound like a news report about liquidation of auto dealerships).
84. See, e.g., Maureen Ohlhausen, Comm'r, Fed. Trade. Comm'n, Speech at the
Better Business Bureau Self-Regulation Conference: Success in Self-Regulation: Strategies
to Bring to the Mobile and Global Era (June 24, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-statements/410391/140624bbbself-
regulation.pdf).
85. John E. Villafranco & Katharine E. Reilly, So You Want to Self-Regulate?
The National Advertising Division as Standard Bearer, ANTITRUST, Spring 2013, at 79.
86. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 299-300 (remarks of Jessica
Rich, Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) (indicating FTC interest in
encouraging the development of best practices by the industry while the Commission
contemplates its "next steps").
87. See Press Release, PR Newswire, The National Advertising Review Council
is Now the Advertising Self-Regulatory Council (ASRC) (Apr. 23, 2012). The ASRC had
been called the National Advertising Review Council ("NARC"), and the name was
changed to ASRC in 2012. Lucille M. Ponte, Mad Men Posing as Ordinary Consumers:
The Essential Role of Self-Regulation and Industry Ethics on Decreasing Deceptive Online
Consumer Ratings and Reviews, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 462, 495-96
(2013). This is the leading self-regulatory regime in the advertising industry. There are
additional self-regulatory efforts, however, including the Direct Marketing Association's e-
business privacy and advertising guidelines. See id. at 496-500. The self-regulatory
framework is governed by advertising ethics codes. Id. For a description of the NAD
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and accuracy in national advertising are enforced by the National Advertising
Division ("NAD") of the Council of Better Business Bureaus. The self-
regulatory process leads to the issuance of approximately 200 decisions per year,
which become the basis of a self-regulatory jurisprudence. 89 According to
observers, FTC Commissioners have been "consistent a d vocal supporters of the
NAD" and "when the Commission does act on matters previously before the NAD,
the agency's actions, for the most part, have been consistent with the self-
regulatory decision."90
The advertising industry's self-regulatory mechanisms have already
addressed native advertising both on a case-by-case and broader policy basis.91
NAD has explicitly determined that consumers have a right to know who authors
"sponsored content."92 At a policy level, and likely in response to the impending
possibility of regulatory action, the IAB recently released ethics rules concerning
process, see, e.g., C. Lee Peeler et al., Centennial of the Council of Better Business Bureaus:
The Important Role of Self-Regulatory Organizations, 9 J. L. ECON. & POL'Y 443 (2013).
88. The NAD's website can be found at http://www.bbb.org/council/the-
national-partner-program/national-advertising-review-services/national-advertising-
division/ (describing NAD's "mission" as "review[ing] national advertising for truthfulness
and accuracy and foster[ing] public confidence in the credibility of advertising .... ).
NAD's decisions are appealable to the National Advertising Review Board. NAD considers
cases brought by competitors and consumers, and also investigations that it self-initiates.
ADVERT. SELF-REGULATORY COUNCIL, THE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY'S PROCESS OF
VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.asrcreviews.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/NAD-CARU-NARB-Procedures-revised-1 .- 141.pdf
(procedures for NAD). Advertisers' participation in the self-regulatory process is voluntary,
but there is broad industry-wide participation in the NAD process. See, e.g., Villafranco &
Reilly, supra note 85, at 79-80. The NAD can refer noncomplying advertisers to the FTC or
other appropriate agencies. Id. at 79.
89. Ohlhausen, supra note 84, at 5; see also Villafranco & Reilly, supra note 85,
at 79-80.
90. Villafranco & Reilly, supra note 85, at 79.
91. See American Media Inc. (Shape Water Boosters), Case #5665, NAD/CARU
Case Reports (Dec. 2013); eSalon (Custom Formulated Hair Color), Case #5645,
NAD/CARU Case Reports (Oct. 2013); Qualcomm Inc. (Snapdragon Processors), NAD
Case Reports, Case #5633 (Sept. 2013); see also Andrew Adam Newman, Promoting Its
Own Products, a Magazine Labels an Ad as News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, at B6; Vega,
supra note 2. Last spring, NAD called content recommendation service Taboola to task for
its labeling practices. Jack Marshall, Native Ad Labeling is a Work in Progress, WALL ST.
J.: CMO TODAY (May 29, 2014, 10:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/05/29/debate-
continues-around-native-ad-labelling/. The Accountability Program sent a compliance
warning to several companies in late 2014 in connection with native advertising. Press
Release, Advertising Self-Regulatory Council, Native or Not, Interest Based Ads Must
Comply with Self Regulation (Dec. 9, 2014) (available at
http://www.asrcreviews.org/2014/12/native-or-not-interest-based-ads-must-comply-with-
self-regulation/); ADVERT. SELF-REGULATORY COUNCIL, COMPLIANCE WARNING (2014),
http://www.asrcreviews.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Compliance-Warning-CW-03-
2014-Native-Advertising.pdf.
92. Native Advertising Playbook, supra note 36, at 15.
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native advertising as part of its Native Advertising Playbook. 93 In light of its
conclusion that the variety of native ads does not admit of specific regulatory rules,
the Native Advertising Playbook seeks to provide the industry with a "framework
... with the goal of eliminating marketplace confusion ... ." 94 It also gives
"Recommended Industry Guidance for Advertising Disclosure and Transparency
for [native] ad units."95
III. NATIVE ADVERTISING AND THE THREAT TO CONSUMERS-
DECEPTION
Unsurprisingly, much of the controversy over native advertising currently
focuses on whether it is deceptive to consumers. If consumers are not aware that a
native ad is a paid placement-rather than independently created content-they
may fail to evaluate its claims critically. Their skepticism might be tempered by
the brand and credibility of the publisher. 96 This is particularly important with
embedded news-like content because processing such information is part of the
consumer's role as a citizen. The ability "to evaluate where information is coming
from, what values it might be representing, whose interests it might be serving, is
93. Id.; see also PUB. RELATIONS Soc'Y OF AM., ETHICAL STANDARDS ADVISORY
ES-19 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.prsa.org/AboutPRSA/Ethics/documents/EthicalStandardsAdvisoryESAl9.pdf
(PRSA's ethics advisory for native ads).
94. Native Advertising Playbook, supra note 36, at 1.
95. Id. The IAB states that "clarity and prominence of the disclosure is
paramount" for all paid native ad units. Id. at 15. "The disclosure must: Use language that
conveys that he advertising has been paid for, thus making it an advertising unit, even if
that unit does not contain traditional promotional advertising messages. . . . Simply put:
Regardless of context, a reasonable consumer should be able to distinguish between what is
paid advertising vs. what is publisher editorial content." Id.
The Newspaper Association of America has taken a "cautious approach to
the transparency issue" and has not issued labeling guidelines on digital presentation of
native ads. Edmonds, supra note 41.
96. Chris Hoofnagle, Notes from a Naif on Native Advertising Impressions from
the FTC's Workshop on Advertorials and Other Disguised Advertising, TAP BLOG (Dec. 6,
2013), http://www.techpolicy.com/Blog/December-2013/Notes-from-a-Naif-on-Native-
Advertising-Impression.aspx; see also Anderson, supra note 31, at 2 (describing how
hidden ads can bypass consumers' "defenses against hucksterism"); Bakshi, supra note 6, at
10-11 ("Such source-based confusion usually leads consumers to trust the subject of the
advertisement more than they otherwise would."); Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be
Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF.
L. REV. 721, 746-47 (2010) ("Consumers trust commercial messages less than
noncommercial ones. . . . [H]idden relationships may give advertisers excessive credibility
by using apparently independent sources to confirm the advertiser's message.").
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essential to our democracy." 97 As social science confirms, source serves an
important heuristic role.98
Some critics see native advertising as inherently deceptive. On this view,
its entire raison d'etre is precisely to disable consumers from being able to
distinguish between editorial content and commercial propaganda-to trick
consumers and end-run ad avoidance.99 Other observers are more optimistic about
the possibility of effective disclosure. They think it is possible to achieve sufficient
transparency to avoid confusion while still ensuring an immersive and integrated
experience for the consumer. oo
The self-regulatory picture with respect to native advertising is currently
mixed. Some observers of the FTC Blurred Lines workshop were quite critical of
self-regulation and the industry's approaches to native ads. 101 Many of the labeling
practices for native advertising are still "neither clear nor conspicuous."102 To
further complicate matters, there are different kinds of native advertising, which
cover a spectrum with regard to transparency.1 0 3 And a recent IAB study found
that the ease of identifying sponsored content varied by type of site, with 82% of
respondents finding sponsorship clear for ads shown on business news sites. 104
Behind the apparent general consensus among advertisers about the need for
97. Damaris Colhoun, Victor Pickard on Native Ads and the New Journalism
Economy, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb. 27, 2015,
http://www.cjr.org/behindthe-news/qavictor-pickard.php; see also Tushnet, supra note
96, at 746-47.
98. See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 747-48; Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2008)
and sources cited therein.
99. See, e.g., Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 129 (panelist
characterizing native advertising as "a hustle, a racket, a grift"). See also Menell, supra note
55, at 814. Some journalists and bloggers agree. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, A Sign of the
Times Ctd, THE DISH (Jan. 9, 2014, 1:13 PM),
http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/01/09/a-sign-of-the-times-ctd/; see also Micah L.
Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497, 522-24
(2015) (describing "manipulative marketing" which is designed to take advantage of
consumers' cognitive limitations); Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8 (discussing
journalist silence); Colhoun, Victor Pickard, supra note 97 (noting a media theorist's
diagnosis of native ads as taking subterfuge and confusion to "a new level").
100. See, e.g., Ryan Chittum, Native Ads Grow Up, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.cjr.org/the-audit/nativeads-grow-up.php.
101. Hoofnagle, supra note 96; see also Bakshi, supra note 6, at 22-24
(explaining skepticism about the sufficiency of self-regulation by both advertisers and news
publishers by reference to industry participants' failure to understand important elements of
the basic regulatory structure).
102. Hoofnagle, supra note 96 (noting that "the disclosure language was [often] in
a very small or less weighty font").
103. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4.
104. INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, GETTING IN-FEED SPONSORED CONTENT
RIGHT: THE CONSUMER VIEW (2014),
http://www.iab.net/media/file/IABEdelmanBerlandStudy.pdf [hereinafter JAB Study].
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transparency1 05 lie industry differences regarding the kind and extent of disclosure
needed. 106 Additionally, publishers, including the traditional news organizations,
lack a unified self-regulatory approach to native ad labeling. 107 Moreover, labeling
practices change over time. 10
The current state of empirical research in this area is quite preliminary.109
Empirical data on consumer attitudes to sponsored content and the extent to which
they distinguish native advertising are scarce. According to a recent study by the
IAB in which consumers were exposed to mock sponsored content placed on
various types of websites, a majority of the participants found that it was not clear
that the ads constituted sponsored content.1 10 This is consistent with the findings
reported by scholars during the Blurred Lines workshop that consumers did not
fully understand the type of disclosure language and cues used in many native ads
105. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4; see also supra text
accompanying notes 75-77.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
107. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 298. Some fetishize their labeling
in the service of transparency, and others are less assiduous in doing so. See, e.g., Edmonds,
supra note 41 ("[N]ot every outlet will be as starchy about labeling as the Times.").
108. For example, the New York Times reportedly changed its labeling policies
with respect to sponsored content by shrinking labels and changing the language, making it
more difficult to identify sponsored content. Michael Sebastian, New York Times Tones
Down Labeling on its Sponsored Posts, ADVERT. AGE (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://adage.com/article/media/york-times-shrinks-labeling-natives-ads/294473/. Even early
adopters of native advertising, such as BuzzFeed, reportedly have changed their disclosure
policies. Id.
109. See, e.g., Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 159. Participants in the
Blurred Lines workshop noted areas of needed and forthcoming empirical study regarding
native ads. Id. at 135-45.
110. INTERACTIVE ADVERT. BUREAU, Critical to Success of In-Feed Sponsored
Content Are Brand Familiarity, Trust and Subject Matter Authority, as well as Relevance,
According to New Research from IAB & Edelman Berland (July 22, 2014),
http://www.iab.net/about the iab/recentpressreleases/pressjrelease-archive/pressreleas
e/pr-072214; see also Jack Marshall, Sponsored Content Isn't Always Clearly Labeled,
Research Suggests, WALL ST. J.: CMO TODAY (July 22, 2014, 5:13 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/07/22/sponsored-content-isnt-always-clearly-labelled-
research-suggests/ (describing study). Even if the term "sponsored by" is evident in the ad,
viewers may not be aware that the sponsor has control over the content. Id. In addition,
research indicates that 50% of consumers do not know the meaning of "sponsored." Bruce
Goldman, FTC Probes Online Masquer-Ads, MEDIA CHANNEL (Dec. 8, 2013),
http://www.mediachannel.org/ftc-probes-online-masquer-ads/ (noting research by Prof.
David Franklyn). A survey by native ad tech company TripleLift recently showed that while
71% of the participating consumers who were exposed to several versions of the same
native ad on a website, with different disclosure labels, reported awareness of the content of
the ad, 62% did not realize they were looking at an ad. Lucia Moses, How Native
Advertising Labeling Confuses People, in 5 Charts, DIGIDAY (May 4, 2015),
http://digiday.com/publishers/5-charts-show-problem-native-ad-disclosure/ (reporting
results). For a typology of different types of deception in advertising, see, e.g., Manoj
Hastak & Michael B. Mazis, Deception By Implication: A Typology of Truthful but
Misleading Advertising and Labeling Claims, 30 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 157, 157
(2011); Moses, supra.
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today.1' Yet if further research confirms indications in preliminary data that
material numbers of consumers do not care whether the editorial platform or the
advertiser pays for the content they find interesting,112 questions can be raised
whether the public perceives consumer confusion over sources to be harmful.113
Although research more directly addressing the area of native advertising has been
promised, 114 much has not yet been undertaken or made publicly available.
Embarking on an attempt to craft labeling rules to protect consumers from
deception engages a live debate on sponsorship disclosure rules for advertising
more generally. 115 Many argue that it is impractical and a waste of resources to go
down this path.1 16
111. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 140-45 (Prof. David Franklyn
study).
112. One panelist at the Blurred Lines workshop referred to preliminary research
indicating that while consumers are often confused by current ad labeling, a sizeable cohort
reported that they "do not care" whether content hey read is sponsored by a brand or
editorial in nature. Id. at 144; see also Meyer, supra note 9 (noting how much readers care
"where each piece of content comes from"). Further study is planned, inter alia, to test
consumer understanding of different kinds of labeling. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note
4, at 189 (testing the difference between "sponsored by Apple" and "text created by
Apple.").
113. See, e.g., Lin Pophal, Consumers Coming to Accept Native Advertising Done
Right, ECONTENT (July 28, 2014), http://www.econtentmag.com/Articles/News/News-
Feature/Consumers-Coming-to-Accept-Native-Advertising-Done-Right-97907.htm;
TRIPLELIFT, Inside Native Advertising 2015 - Trends & Insights (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://www.slideshare.net/TripleLift/2015-state-of-native-advertising.
It should be noted that these are industry-sponsored empirical studies. Such
assertions beg for critical assessment. See Colhoun, Victor Pickard, supra note 97
(suggesting that industry findings that consumers care less about sponsorship than quality of
content are suspect as "self-serving"). It is also hard to believe that such findings would
apply to the kind of content in the news that is relevant to self-governance, or that was
assumed to be attributable to a neutral, unbiased source. Those study responders who said
they did not care whether content was paid for might well have been assuming a comparable
degree of accuracy and neutrality in the paid and unpaid editorial content. Their responses
might have been markedly different if they were to make the contrary assumption.
Moreover, the problem here is that such critics have too narrow a view of harm. In any
event, even though preliminary survey findings noted above may show a significant
percentage of respondents who "do not care," they are far less than the majority surveyed.
114. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 137, 142, 189-90 (Franklyn and
Hoofnagle comments regarding needed areas for future research). For example, further
study is planned to test consumer understanding of different kinds of labeling. Id. at 189.
115. Compare Goodman, supra note 16 (arguing for the need to "revamp[] and
extend[] sponsorship disclosure law"), with Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating
Stealth Marketing: A Comment on Ellen Goodman's Stealth Marketing and Editorial
Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 11 (2006) (questioning the viability of mandatory
disclosure requirements and their undesirable consequences), Said, supra note 81, at 105
(2010) (characterizing the media consumer as a sophisticated "venture consumer" for whom
such disclosure is unnecessary), and R. Polk Wagner, Comments on Stealth Marketing and
Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 17, 17 (2006) (expressing doubt that a
disclosure regime is "either worthwhile or even wise, given the radical changes in the nature
of the media markets . . ."). For a broader attack on mandated disclosure regimes, see, e.g.,
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
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Yet, as is argued further below, there is little reason not to turn attention
to improved ad labeling to reduce consumer deception. 117 Whatever their
differences, all industry players' concerns about alienating their customers should
create incentives to explore optimizing disclosure of native advertising in the news
space. 1 Constitutional challenges to labeling requirements are likely to fail,
especially if native ads are analyzed under the rubric of commercial speech
doctrine-and, in any event, self-interest should lead news organizations not o
jump to testing the constitutional question in court. 119
IV. BEYOND DECEPTION: MAPPING THE EXPRESSIVE AND
INSTITUTIONAL THREATS POSED BY NATIVE ADVERTISING
Although the focus on consumer deception is appropriate and worthwhile,
the rise of modern native advertising presents a more intractable problem. Sooner
or later, the wholesale turn to native advertising will have an impact on the
editorial content in which it is embedded, the institutional power of the news
media, and the constitutional status of the press.120 Even if native advertising only
disseminates truthful information, and even if it is well labeled and separated from
its associated editorial content, it nevertheless threatens the democratic role of the
press and editors' independent journalistic decisions about what to cover.
A. Threats to Independent Editorial Judgment and Accountability Journalism
There has always been a tension between commercial and journalistic
interests in the advertising-supported press, but the conflict has traditionally been
resolved structurally, via the "church/state divide" or "wall of separation" between
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2014); see also infra text
accompanying notes 244-45.
116. For a discussion of how corrective labeling disclosure, called "voice
priming" disclosure below, might be a workable alternative, see infra Section VI.A.
117. See discussion infra Section V.A. (detailing plausible strategies for
developing generally workable labeling standards to reduce consumer deception).
118. See Moses, supra note 110 (reporting on ANA survey results indicating
agreement among two-thirds of ANA members that clear disclosure is necessary); Sheelagh
Doyle, ANA Study Reveals Marketers are Increasing Spend on Native Advertising But
Disclosure, Ethics and Measurement are Key Issues, Ass'N OF NAT'L ADVERTISERS (Jan.
29, 2015), https://www.ana.net/content/show/id/33530. This Section does not distinguish
between, or opine as to the comparative desirability and feasibility of, administrative versus
self-regulation. See infra Section V.C (describing self-regulation-promoting strategies).
119. See infra Section IV.C (describing decreasing recognition of press
exceptionalism as a matter of constitutional law).
120. This is not the first scholarly warning as to the expressive threats posed by
hidden advertising. In her landmark article, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity,
Professor Ellen Goodman explains that, in addition to deceiving audiences and adding to the
commercialism in media and society, stealth marketing more fundamentally undermines
democratic discourse by damaging "the integrity ... of . . . the media institutions" that
support it. See generally Goodman, supra notes 16, 86. Joining Professor Goodman's
warnings about the discourse harms posed by hidden advertising, Professor Peter Menell
has recently cautioned that integrated advertising "represents a subtle, but real and present
threat to expressive freedom, free will, and public well-being." See Menell, supra note 55,
at 788; see also Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8; Meyer, supra note 9.
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the two.121 Enshrined in both professional ethics codes and news organization
internal rules, the separation has been touted as the basis for the credibility and
legitimacy of the commercial press. At the same time, mainstream media have
often been criticized as overly responsive to advertiser pressure.122 So why is
today's native advertising more worrisome with respect to the democratic,
institutional, and constitutional role of the press than its predecessors in stealth
marketing?
1. Corporatized News and the Press/Brand Balance
Advertisers see a great deal of benefit in native advertising to enhance
their brands and technology enables expansion and "scalability" 123 of native
advertising. Such advertising is perceived as particularly effective, commands
heavy brand resources, and has established a notable footprint in news. This
means that advertisers have much at stake in the success of the native advertising
121. The structural separation of the advertising and journalistic teams was a
hallmark of traditional news organizations in the United States in the twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. See, e.g., Nick Couldry & Joseph Turow, Advertising, Big Data and
the Clearance of the Public Realm: Marketers' New Approaches to the Content Subsidy, 8
INT'L J. OF COMM. 1710, 1715 (2014); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 54, at 337-38.
During that period, both newspapers and broadcast networks touted the independence of
their editorial departments and their advertising functions, with the advertising side
portrayed as a necessary evil whose impact on the institutions would be minimized to the
extent possible. This was so even when broadcasters allowed advertisers to sponsor
entertainment programming. Couldry & Turow, supra, at 1715. The payola scandal in radio
airplay, and the quiz show scandal on television caused public outcries and led to
congressional prohibitions. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 16, at 85, 89 and sources cited
therein; Anderson, supra note 31, at 2-3 (describing public outrage); Kielbowicz &
Lawson, supra note 54, at 333-69; see also R.H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television
Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269, 287-95 (1979). The church/state divide thereafter
gained traction in broadcasting, reflecting itself in internal guidelines on the relationship
between ads and the news. Professional ethics codes, like those of the Society of
Professional Journalists, foreground this issue: journalists must "[d]istinguish news from
advertising and shun hybrids that blur the lines between the two [while] [p]rominently
labelfing] sponsored content." Soc'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, SPJ CODE OF ETHICS (Sept.
6, 2014), http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp.
122. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 2097, 2202 (1992). For a recent example of such a critique, see John Plunkett &
Ben Quinn, Telegraph's Peter Osborne Resigns, Saying HSBC Coverage a 'Fraud on
Readers,' THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:54 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/feb/17/peter-obome-telegraph-hsbc-coverage-
fraud-readers (describing resignation of chief political commentator of British newspaper
The Daily Telegraph and his "blistering [public] attack" on the newspaper for "deliberately
suppress[ing] stories about the banking giant [HSBC] ... in order to keep its valuable
advertising account"); see also Kevin Draper, Dan Gilbert Didn't Like A Yahoo Blog Post,
So Yahoo Deleted It, DEADSPIN (Feb. 12, 2015), http://deadspin.com/dan-gilbert-didnt-like-
a-yahoo-blog-post-so-yahoo-dele-1685364080 (describing purported threat to fire a sports
writer over his critical comment about Quicken Loans, which is owned by an NBA owner
and is a partner with Yahoo!).
123. Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 70-71.
124. See generally Bakshi, supra note 6.
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model. This can create incentives to seek more involvement in the news
publisher's editorial and placement decisions.
At the same time, news organizations have economic needs that can
conveniently be met by attracting brands. By contrast to the legacy days of
advertising, though, brands no longer absolutely need media intermediaries to
reach their desired audiences. 125 The low digital barriers to entry, the ability to
create their own high-quality "brand newsrooms,"1 2 6 and the spread of information
on social media all shift the balance of power between the brands and their ad
publishers in the digital context.127 Because advertisers can communicate directly
to readers and consumers without the intermediation of editorial voices (other than
those of commercial entities such as Facebook), they now hold the upper hand.
News organizations will find it more difficult to resist the financial
opportunities offered by brands because the constraints that traditionally kept
advertorials in check, like audience disapprobation and the perceived
independence of programmers, have diminished. 12 Because native advertising is
fully integrated into the journalistic content, it will inevitably influence the
direction of the content itself. To attract desirable brands, news organizations will
inevitably have incentives to generate content with which such brands would wish
to be associated. The editorial decision process will become cognizant of, and at
least partly responsive to, the interests of their brand advertisers (who can credibly
threaten to take their business elsewhere). 129 The question is one of
independence. 130
Journalists, even celebrity journalists, do not have the heft to constrain
newspaper publishers' economically-grounded coverage decisions. Although the
Internet has allowed the rise of celebrity, "branded" journalists, whose identities
capture public attention beyond their mere affiliation with their particular news
organization, the reality is that those types of journalists are few and far between.
Further, recent high-profile protest resignations by journalists notwithstanding,131
the fact that even celebrity journalists are invited to leave if they have
125. Kutsch, supra note 34 (quoting Professor Jay Rosen).
126. See Meyer, supra note 9 (describing how brands' content-marketing teams
can end-run intermediary news sites to reach audiences).
127. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 3-4; Couldry & Turow, supra note
121, at 1715-16.
128. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 2-3.
129. See Meyer, supra note 9 (describing how Time Inc. editors now report to
managers on the business side and how executives at Vice must be informed about stories
that mention advertisers or other corporate brands). We can expect advertisers' personalized
content creation and publishers' ability to analyze online engagement data to induce editors
to "vary their own material based on their visitors. . Couldry & Turow, supra note 121,
at 1717.
130. See, e.g., Kellie Riordan, Accuracy, Independence & Impartiality, Reuters
Institute for the Study of Journalism, Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, Univ. of Oxford, at
27 (2014).
131. See, e.g., Plunkett & Quinn, supra note 122 (discussing political
commentator Osborne's protest resignation).
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disagreements with management suggests the limits of their influence. 132 In some
number of digital native news sites, it is understood that writers must seek
approval in order to write about the sites' advertisers. 133
The economic imperative has been used by news organizations to justify
a number of moves that particularly threaten editorial independence. Structural
factors, such as the development of in-house advertising production and the
heightened involvement of journalists in producing native advertising,
fundamentally and particularly compromise the traditional "church/state" divide or
"wall of separation" between ad and editorial content. Although it could be argued
that native ad production in-house, "Mad Men-style, could generate some cool
storytelling experiments,"1 3 4 it is likely that "the ad-think will inevitably creep into
the editorial content." 135 In some circumstances, this will happen because the
editorial side will be directly involved in the ad content production.136 But even in
132. Ravi Somaiya, Ezra Klein Is Said to Plan to Leave Washington Post, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014, at B3; Margaret Sullivan, Nate Silver Went Against the Grain for Some
at The Times, N.Y. TIMES: PUB. EDITOR'S J. (July 22, 2013, 1:51 PM),
http://publiceditor.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/nate-silver-went-against-the-grain-for-
some-at-the-times/. This appears to be the case even in the "new" media, although detailed
evidence is lacking. So, for example, although highly regarded, Matt Taibbi was hired by
Pierre Omidyar's First Look Media, he left, purportedly because of undisclosed
disagreements with respect to journalistic matters.
Most insidiously, celebrity may constrain and skew journalists' news
judgments and compromise their ability to be the industry's conscience. For a recent
suggestion that celebrity might tempt "branded" journalists into "infotaintment" rather than
truth-telling, see Edward Kosner, The Temptation of the Celebrity Journalist, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 9, 2015, 7:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/edward-kosner-the-temptation-of-the-
celebrity-journalist-1423527690.
133. Leaked emails from Vice Media indicate that is the case at Vice, for
example. Andy Cush, Emails: Vice Requires Writers to Get Approval to Write About
Brands, GAWKER (Oct. 2, 2014, 11:50 AM), http://www.gawker.com/this-is-how-your-
vice-media-sausage-gets-made-1641615517; see also Simon Owens, Will the FTC Soon
Rain on Native Advertising's Parade, SIMON OWENS (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.simonowens.net/is-it-time-for-the-ftc-to-rain-on-native-advertisings-parade
(describing Vice episode and BuzzFeed's removal of a post critical of Dove, a BuzzFeed
sponsor).
134. Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8 (quoting Patrick Howe, Cal Poly
professor who researches impact of native ads on credibility of news sites). Also, it could be
argued that having journalists or journalistically-trained copywriters could improve both the
accuracy and relevance of the native advertising they produce because of their professional
training and their familiarity with the style and editorial approach of the news outlet. But
that is precisely the problem, and far too narrow a focus. The concern is less the accuracy of
the specific native ad than the integrity of the overall editorial enterprise.
135. Id. When "news shed[s] its skin and [becomes] content," George Simpson,
Commentary, Content: The Race to the Bottom, MEDIA DAILY NEWS (Sept. 13, 2013, 7:54
AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/20895 1/content-the-race-to-the-
bottom.html?edition=64470, news judgment and journalistic norms as such become far less
central.
136. See, e.g., Tanzina Vega, Harper's Redesigns Its Web Site and Embraces
Branded Content, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, at B8 (discussing the involvement of the
Hearst editorial team in the creation of "high-quality advertising experience."); Vega, supra
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contexts in which that is not explicitly the case, pressure is to be expected from
more complex reporting relationships. Factors that may affect the church/state
divide include the cost that has to be recouped from creating a marketing team in-
house, the fact that some of the in-house copywriters will actually be journalists
not materially different from those on the editorial side, and the very legitimation
of marketing as an important news-like function. Once both journalists and in-
house native copywriters are seen as "story-tellers" engaged in "storytelling," the
news outlet is engaging in "corporatized news" 137 that is very difficult to
distinguish from a commercial.
When the brand-content journalists sit down in the corporate lunchroom
with their editorial-side counterparts, isn't it likely that the flow of conversation
and influence will become routinized, and seem both naturalized and almost
undetectable even to the participants? One also wonders about the editorial team's
appetite even to cover the activities of the in-house brand marketers, especially
when making money through native ads is presented as an existential financial
imperative with all participants in the organization in the same boat. 138 Having
journalists-turned-copywriters in-house will make it easier for them to appropriate
the trappings of journalism, without the journalistic mission, on behalf of
brands. 139 It is telling that news organizations today are firing newsroom staff at
the very moment that hey are increasing the journalistically trained hiring on the
native ad production side of the house.140 Reduced resources on the editorial side
will doubtless impact the reporting function, and might even lead to reduced
attention to the "real" journalism produced by reporters. At a minimum, this raises
questions about whether the new advertising resources are in fact helping the
editorial mission.
News organizations' business strategies of monetizing their content by
licensing its use by others, including advertisers, also transform newspapers'
coverage incentives. When news is perceived at every level as a business, news
organizations begin to see their function far more as persuading than as reporting
truth and checking official abuse. 141 Moreover, when advertisers directly
disseminate news content-repurposed to achieve their own commercial goals, and
note 2 (noting that Mashable editorial employees had written most of the articles that
appeared on the site without disclosing that they were paid for by Qualcomm). This does
not make such content noncommercial, however. See infra text accompanying note 214.
137. Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8.
138. One critical journalist notes that the New York Times has not run "a pointed,
critical piece about storytelling ads" since September 2013, "right before they started doing
them." Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8. The Times' ombudsman has also been quiet
on the issue.
139. Meyer, supra note 9 ("As content marketers grow more sophisticated, they
will continue to adopt the trappings of journalism, if not the journalistic mission.").
140. A recent report, for example, notes that the New York Times has cut 100
newsroom jobs, but is currently hiring for its Paid Post operation. Ravi Somaiya, New York
Times Co. Profit Falls Despite Strides in Digital Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, at B3.
141. Riordan, supra note 130; see also REUTERS INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
JOURNALISM, Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2013: Tracking The Future Of News
(June 20, 2013), http://media.digitalnewsreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Reuters-
Institute-Digital-News-Report-2013.pdf.
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without having to account to (or be controlled by) the originating news
organization for their uses-the news organization loses control of its own brand
and reputation. And if the news organizations are themselves sellers of products,
won't they have incentives to keep their buyers happy with their content? Once we
shift focus from journalism to the business of journalism, the democratic balance
has been tipped.
In sum, the fact that the content is sponsored does not mean only that the
sponsor will exercise some level of control over the specific material that it
sponsors. The broader question is whether the content sponsorship-and the
association of news material with advertising brands-will subtly invoke the brand
in editorial decisions beyond the specific native advertisement for which the
advertiser has paid. There are examples of the advertisers' interests driving the
creation of content, rather than advertisers simply positioning their ads in
independently produced content that they find relevant to their desired
audiences. 142 This is a particular concern when news outlets partner with
commercial, brand-promoting entities, and even, short of partnership, when they
enter into long-term native advertising relationships.
Is all this making a mountain out of a molehill? Thus far, one could argue,
only one institutionally embarrassing snafu for a traditional news organization
using native ads has made the headlines. In January 2013, The Atlantic issued an
apology for publishing an ad by the Church of Scientology that appeared
indistinguishable from the magazine's normal editorial content.143 Some sponsored
content-such as the New York Times series on women in prison, sponsored by
Netflix and the television show, "Orange Is the New Black"-has been received
with significant critical acclaim. 144 The advertising industry's self-regulatory
142. The three publishers represented at the FTC's workshop Mashable, the
Huffington Post, and the Hearst Corporation-revealed examples of advertising generating
and shaping what otherwise looks like editorial content. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra
note 4, at 42-58; Hoofnagle, supra note 96. Mashable, for example, created new content for
Qualcomm that profiled electronics made with Qualcomm components. Blurred Lines
Workshop, supra note 4. While the content did not directly promote the company's brand, it
was related to its business. Id. This is the same with American Express and Marriott. Id. at
44. The Huffington Post published an article about popular water festivals in order to
promote a waterproof Sony device. Id. at 49-50. Hearst created an UGG shoes feature for
Nordstrom, advising consumers how to transition to winter shoes. Id. at 54-55. A native
advertising campaign for Tyson Nudges associated the brand with some of the best existing
news content produced by the editorial side of the site. Id. See also Simpson, supra note 135
(arguing, in the context of news in social media, that "[f]or every newborn panda you see,
you are NOT seeing something far more important that happened that day").
143. See, e.g., Brian Stelter & Christine Haughney, The Atlantic Apologizes for
Scientology Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, at B3. While the web page on which the ad
appeared was labeled "sponsored content," the rest "looked like a sunny blog post about the
church's expansion." Id. When reporters from other news organizations noticed it, the ad
was removed from The Atlantic's website expeditiously. Id.
144. Lucia Moses, New York Times Debuts the 'Snowfall' of Native Ads,
DIGIDAY (June 14, 2014), http://digiday.com/publishers/new-york-times-native-ad-thats-
winning-skeptics/.
674 [VOL. 57:647
2015] NATIVE ADVERTISING 675
mechanisms have targeted some of the worst disclosure offenders.145 So what is
the real problem that is not being adequately addressed by the market? As with all
these things, however, there is a question to which we have no answer: Has native
advertising had any as-yet-unrevealed impact on the press beyond the headlines
like The Atlantic's misstep? Are there reasons to fear that, over time, the
credibility of news sites will be eroded by native advertising? To those questions,
this Article argues "yes."146
If so, news organizations' experiments with native advertising, and the
structural changes they have implemented to enhance such advertising, may well
lead to a catastrophic result if the press does not exercise sufficient care. It is a
common intuition that news brands can be tarnished and lose credibility if they are
revealed to have too much hidden native advertising.147 When that happens, brands
will no longer see (much of) a benefit from continuing to advertise on those
sites. Having lost major sources of revenue, those sites will no longer have either
the financial wherewithal or the reputation to engage in accountability journalism.
This, in turn, will reduce the power of the press and its ability to engage in
democracy-enhancing political speech. 148 The money to be made from native
advertising during the transition period is unlikely to outweigh the longer-term
problems.
2. Amplifying Factors: The Broader Digital Context
Obviously, native advertising is not the only element of the digital news
environment that is likely to have an impact on journalistic-coverage choices. A
complex mosaic of pressures on journalism, borne of technological change,
amplifies the expressive threats of native advertising. From personalized news and
145. See Villafranco & Reilly, supra note 85.
146. Early empirical studies seem to support this conclusion. See, e.g., Henriette
Cramer, Effects of Ad Quality & Content-Relevance on Perceived Content Quality, CHI
2015 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL ACM CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2231-34 (Apr. 18, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2702123.2702360
(noting that, because of lower perceptions of site quality, "we provide a signal that it is in
the best interest of ad-serving platforms to ensure that ads are not only high quality, but also
easily distinguishable from content to avoid doubts on content provenance"); see also
Moses, supra note 110 (reporting on 2014 Contently survey results showing that a majority
of readers do not trust sponsored content, and two-thirds reported feeling deceived when
told that content had been brand-sponsored); Bakshi, supra note 6, at 9 (reporting research
results).
147. See, e.g., Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8; Bakshi, supra note 6, at
19-22 (arguing that native ads' harms to consumers and citizens both are particularly acute
today).
148. There are other potential consequences too, as can be seen by the current
vaccine controversy. Despite the lack of scientific evidence to prove that vaccination causes
autism and other harms, significant segments of the public apparently believe that
newspaper reports of the safety of vaccines cannot be believed because of news
organizations' ties to the pharmaceutical industry. See Clyde Haberman, A Discredited
Vaccine Study's Continuing Impact on Public Health, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/us/a-discredited-vaccine-studys-continuing-impact-on-
public-health.html?_r-0.
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advertising enabled by big data, to the increasing use of audience interest metrics
to drive editorial and coverage judgments, to the decline of the long-form news
story, to the connection between news and social media, and to the flattening effect
of digital transmission, digital technology has transformed both journalism and
advertising. News organizations have recognized the profit associated with
ideological partisanship in a media environment that easily allows people to limit
their exposure to ideologically agreeable information. 149 The mix of these
developments creates a perfect storm likely to have a negative effect on the press
and its work.
For example, although it is beyond the scope of this Article to address the
multiplicity of consequences resulting from big data collection, 1o it is important to
see how native ads fit into the current informational environment of behavioral
targeting. Perhaps the most notable aspect of today's online landscape is the
massive availability of personalized information about consumers and the
aggressive deployment of data mining and analytics to personalize content and
advertising directed at consumers. To the extent that such "daily me" 152
communications are successful at making the process of editorial selection
invisible in practice, and to the extent that they result in a "naturalized" output hat
quiets the critical faculty of the reader, we can expect that seamlessly incorporated
native ads will also benefit from silencing the reader's skepticism.153 If everyone
receives a different news feed, and a different native ad integrated into it, then it is
also more difficult to generate critical communities that can help consumers assess
those ads. This can exacerbate the possibility of market manipulation and
marketing to consumer vulnerabilities. 154
149. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson, Ideology, Psychology and Law 13-14 (Harv.
Pub. L., Working Paper No. 12-18, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2012939.
150. For a recent critique of behavioral advertising, see, e.g., Katherine J.
Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market's Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 95 (2013).
151. One of the consequences of data mining is that it generates more and more
data. See Strandburg, supra note 150; see also Couldry & Turow, supra note 121
(describing the democratic harms of advertising personalization).
152. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 153 (1995); see also CASS
SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001), http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7014.pdf
(lamenting some anti-democratic effects of such personalization).
153. See Menell, supra note 55, at 793-94; but cf Marisa E. Main, Simply
Irresistible: Neureomarketing and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 50 DuQ. L. REV. 605,
627 (2012) (describing the ways in which neuromarketing can manipulate decision-making
processes).
Admittedly, the relationship between personalized editorial content and
personalized native advertising is likely to be complex. Perhaps the ability to personalize
advertisements will reduce brands' need to rely on native advertising to end-run ad
avoidance. While this may be true in theory, targeted advertising is not yet sophisticated
enough to disable consumer distaste for ads. Moreover, native advertising valuably
associates brands with highly respected publishers and the targeted ad does not achieve that
brand-associated bump for the advertisers.
154. For an excellent overview, see Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014) (sketching out the view that the consumer of the future
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Another element hat may amplify the expressive threat is an increase in
news organizations' ability to track and assess the ffectiveness of their editorial
content on a granular, article-by-article basis. Joined with a revised view of the
relationship between the news organization and "the people formerly called the
audience,"15 5 news organizations can increasingly rely on story popularity to make
editorial choices. 156 This leads to a re-imagining of the editorial structure and
mission of news organizations. Editors may choose what to cover at least partly
based on popularity rather than on the basis of independent professional news
judgment. If popularity is the metric warranting inclusion, and if branded content
is successful and popular, then such content will become overly represented on the
news sites at the expense of professional newsworthiness assessments. 157
Yet another issue is the observation that a lack of linear structure on the
Web leads to all content being "flattened out," with the concomitant difficulty in
distinguishing between content types. 158 When "the trade dress disappears [and the
lines between marketing, editorial, and government content disappear], are you
reading news from a verifiable, reliable source, or are you reading propaganda?"159
Many "new media" triumphalists celebrate the access to facts, data,
opinion, and diversity given to audiences by the digital Fourth Estate, and are not
particularly troubled by the fact that "in an age of plenty the consumer has a
greater role to play and responsibility for what they consume." 160 Some media
outlets have outsourced accuracy, placing responsibility for skepticism and fact-
checking with the audience. 161 A problem with this, though, is that the
deceptiveness of native advertising is naturally amplified in an environment in
which news consumers, not trained professionals, must assess the credibility and
accuracy of virtually every bit of news with which they are presented. Imposing on
consumers the responsibility not only of verification of accuracy, but also of
will be increasingly mediated and that corporations will be able to take advantage of that by
marketing to individuals' vulnerabilities and cognitive biases) and sources cited therein.
155. Jay Rosen, The People Formerly Known as the Audience, PRESSTHINK (June
27, 2006), http://archive.pressthink.org/2006/06/27/pplfrmr.html.
156. David Carr, Risks Abound as Reporters Play in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2014, at Bl; see also Alexis Sobel Fitts, When Metrics Drive Newsroom Culture,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May 11, 2015,
http://www.cjr.org/analysis/how should-metrics-drivenewsroom-culture.php.
157. This of course assumes that here are some shared professional
newsworthiness norms beyond popularity.
For indications that audience preferences might have increased impact even
among the stodgiest of old media, see, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 58 (New York Times' Dean
Baquet announcing the formation of "an audience development department."). For a recent
report on the effects of metric-driven newsrooms, see Fitts, supra note 156; Couldry &
Turow, supra note 121, at 1717 (arguing that we can expect advertisers' personalized
content creation and publishers' ability to analyze online engagement data to induce editors
to "vary their own material based on their visitors . . .").
158. See, e.g., Riordan, supra note 130, at 27, 46, 56.
159. Id. at 27 (citing to a source quoting New York Times media correspondent
David Carr).
160. Id. at 10 (citing Cardiff Prof. Sambrook).
161. Id.
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verification of source, is an amplified burden, which the flattening character of the
Internet makes worse. To the extent that cognitive biases lead to bounded
rationality in the first instance, adding more complexity to the news consumer's
deliberative choices will make her less able to engage in informed judgment.
B. Threats to the Institution and Power of the Press
In addition to threatening editorial independence as such, the legitimation
of native advertising also presents another danger to the traditional press's
democratic role: the diminution of its institutional role and power. While this is a
somewhat indirect effect, it is an important one nonetheless.
As any associated stigma increasingly diminishes with significant
mainstream adoption of the practice, traditional news organizations that might
have disdained the necessary but unseemly role of advertising might now feel
competitively required to adapt. If native advertising is framed as an institutional
savior of the traditional press, then the institutions are likely to be more open to
compromises even with respect to content. Obviously, this will be a matter of
degree, but the existence of the institutional pressure is significant. A recent study
shows that brands receive reputational benefits from association with the
reputations of elite news organizations, but also pose reputational threats to those
organizations.162 At least in the long run, a press whose editorial independence is
in doubt will become a hobbled press.
The success of the institutional press as watchdog depends on several
things: government's belief that press disclosure of government missteps will lead
to public outrage or legislative activity; the institutional capacity and resources of
the press to litigate in order to constrain government and establish expressive
rights; and access to information. The bottom line is that the press has to be seen as
independent, powerful, and credible by a number of important actors, including the
government, courts, legislatures, whistleblowers, and other potential sources. The
more compromised the press is, or at least is perceived to be, in its independence,
the greater the likelihood that it loses credibility in the eyes of all these
constituencies. When the press's reputation is such that: (1) people do not believe
press pronouncements; (2) government is not afraid that the press will effectively
reveal wrongdoing; (3) courts become skeptical about its democracy-sustaining
162. This is not meant simply to refer to the "objective" mainstream press, which
has been subject to critique both from without and within the journalistic profession. For a
recent debate on journalistic objectivity versus transparency, see, e.g., Bill Keller, Is Glenn
Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/opinion/a-conversation-in-lieu-of-a-
column.html?pagewanted=all; see also David Domingo et al., Tracing Digital News
Networks, 3 DIGITAL J. 1, 10 (2015) (observing "new rituals of transparency" substituting
for the old "[t]he rituals of objectivity"). The key point is belief in the editorial
independence of the press, regardless of whether its reporting philosophy is activist or
neutral and objective. IAB Study, supra note 104.
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role; and (4) sources and information dry up, then the power of the press to check
abuse of official power is significantly undermined. 163
These concerns are particularly important today because an independent,
fearless, and powerful press could serve as a critical bulwark against global
governmental overreaching. Certainly the traditional press is not the only such
bulwark; indeed, it is currently quite a tarnished and diminished one. Nevertheless,
we should not abandon it. It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail the ways
in which new forms of expressive controls collusively wielded by powerful
government and private actors-what Professor Jack Balkin has called "new-
school" press regulation 16 4-present a multi-modal, powerful net of threats to free
speech and government accountability.165 Suffice it to say, however, that a press
whose credibility is doubted by the population, which cannot attract sources, of
which courts are skeptical, and which is not feared by governments, is inevitably
damaged in performing its (at least aspirational) democratic functions. The U.S.
press has already hobbled itself on many fronts with institutional and professional
failures unrelated to native advertising-squandering the public trust that a post-
163. Professor David Anderson has recently argued that the "strongest case for
constitutional protection of the press rests on its role as an organizer of democratic
dialogue" rather than as performer of "unique constitutional functions in gathering and
disseminating information and checking power." David A. Anderson, The Press and
Democratic Dialogue, 127 HARV. L. REV. 331 (2014). I wonder whether there is more to be
said for the uniqueness of the press's possible checking function than Professor Anderson
allows. Regardless, I do not take Professor Anderson as rejecting an institutional role for the
press in checking government and the powerful, when it can. Although I do not disagree
with his skepticism about increasing limits to its ability to do so, my point is simply the
smaller one that further challenges to the independence and legitimacy of the press will
embolden miscreants to act with reduced concerns about press oversight and disclosure. In
any event, the dive into native advertising is also likely to undermine the press's role as
organizer of democratic dialogue.
164. Balkin, supra note 20.
165. Other channels, like Wikileaks, which leaked the Private Manning
documents revealing U.S. conduct in the war, cannot act as government watchdogs in the
same way and to the same extent that the institutional press can. A credible and
sophisticated press can better analyze, explain, contextualize, and weigh the benefits of
publishing the type of material revealed by Wikileaks. If it is independent and generally
credible, then the institutional press can serve as a comparatively trusted party situated
between government and more anarchic digital players. Moreover, the institutional press is
less directly subject to government control, because, for example, it is easier for the
government to indict individual leakers who are more isolated from the industry. Matt
Apuzzo, Holder Fortifies Protection of News Media's Phone Records, Notes or Emails,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015, at A18; Matt Appuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to
Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2015, at Al (describing the Obama
Administration's abandonment of its seven-year attempt to force the New York Times
journalist James Risen to testify as to the identity of a confidential CIA source,
demonstrating the difficulties of attempting to control mainstream journalists associated
with traditional news organizations); see also Keith Bybee, Justice Stewart Meets the Press,
in JUDGING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE OF U.S. SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES (Helen J. Knowles & Steven B. Lichtman eds., 2015) (explaining why the
blogosphere cannot adequately perform Justice Stewart's view of the press's structural
function of "toe-to-toe confrontation with federal powers").
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Watergate public had in a neutral and independent media.1 6 6 Native advertising
could well serve to push the press over the edge of credibility. 167 Despite the
existence of other powerful participants in public discussion, this would be a
serious loss.168
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL THREAT
Notwithstanding the two types of threats posed by native advertising (to
consumers and to journalism), there are arguments that the First Amendment
should be read to block attempts to minimize such threats. Such arguments
implicitly cast the anti-regulatory stance as a call for expressive freedom. The
press itself, and not only the advertising industry, could easily be seduced by such
arguments. The first constitutional issue is whether advertisers and press, reliant on
native ads, could successfully argue that attempts to regulate in this space would
face constitutional infirmity under current First Amendment doctrine. Even if the
answer to that is yes, the second question is whether constitutional protection for
such advertising would be a Pyrrhic victory because native advertising undermines
recognition of the broader, special constitutional status of the press.
166. See sources cited in Bakshi, supra note 6, at 19 nn.54-56 (discussing post-
Watergate institutional trust in the media). That trust has eroded, in part, by the political
polarization enabled by niche news programming, distaste for increased media
sensationalism, and media incompetence and falsehood. See Emily Steel & Ravi Somaiya,
Brian Williams Suspended from NBC for 6 Months Without Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2015, at Al (discussing then-NBC News anchor Brian Williams' false reports of being fired
on while embedded with U.S. troops in a helicopter during the Iraq war). On the effects of
focusing on metrics in newsrooms, see, e.g., Fitts, supra note 156.
167. Approaches relying on the noncommercial news sector are not adequate
alternatives. If the United States is not currently likely to make a significant commitment to
public media; if government sponsorship comes with its own difficulties at a time when the
relationship between government and press is particularly fraught; and if philanthropic
support of the press has a limited footprint, then looking to noncommercial outlets to make
up for the inadequacies of commercially-funded news production is quixotic.
168. This Article leaves it to later work to defend the continuing need for a
powerful traditional institutional press in the United States as part of today's complex media
sector. Some have faith that the massive technology companies like Google and Twitter can
serve as the new vanguard in developing worldwide free expression norms, effectively
minimizing the significance of, and perhaps the continuing need for, the traditional
institutional press. For a recent account of the increasing significance of free speech
lawyering by technology company lawyers, see generally Marvin Ammori, The "New"
New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 2259 (2014). Although such companies clothe their businesses in the mantle of free
speech, see id. at 2260, their business is actually monetizing information rather than
promoting democratic discourse or the public interest. Id. at 2270. Further, even if these
publicly-traded companies can fight for free speech norms, their incentive to do so is
variable, depending on their global economic interests. See Colhoun, Victor Pickard, supra
note 97. While this is not to deny the compromised character of the highly consolidated
traditional press sector, it is to warn that one should not mistake Google and Twitter's
incentives for those either of the New York Times or the public interest blogger.
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A. First Amendment Challenges to Regulability
Were further disclosure rules for native advertising adopted by regulators
such as the FTC or FCC, query whether such rules would face First Amendment
hurdles. 169 Under conventional free speech doctrine since the 1970s, the critical
threshold issue would be whether native advertising would be analyzed as
commercial or noncommercial speech.
1. Under Classic Commercial Speech Doctrine
Although commercial advertising was considered completely excluded
from First Amendment protection as late as 1942 in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 170
developing commercial speech doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s rapidly brought
informational advertising under the constitutional umbrella. 171 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court's commercial speech cases made clear that restrictions on such
speech would receive more relaxed constitutional scrutiny than noncommercial
expression, and many advertising regulations thereby passed constitutional
muster.172 The Court's commercial speech jurisprudence of the 1980s accords
particularly deferential scrutiny to advertising regulations designed to protect
consumers from deception. 173 The Court in Zauderer, for example, subjected
mandated speech disclosures (as opposed to speech restrictions) to First
Amendment review under an even more relaxed standard, akin to rational basis
review. 174 Because protection of commercial speech was "justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information such speech provides," 175 mandated
factual disclosure did not even have to satisfy the intermediate level of First
169. For an earlier argument that carefully drawn sponsorship-disclosure
requirements would survive constitutional scrutiny, see, e.g., Goodman, supra note 16, at
130-36. For arguments that existing regulatory power could apply to native ads, see, e.g.,
Bakshi, supra note 6; Gottfried, supra note 38.
170. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) ("[T]he Constitution imposes no ... restraint[s] on
government as respects purely commercial advertising.").
171. The key cases recognizing some constitutional protection for advertising
were Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
172. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566 (articulating a four-pronged standard of
intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech).
173. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 99; Jonathan Weinberg, On Commercial - and
Corporate - Speech (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2014-12, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517599.
174. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 656 (1985)
(upholding against First Amendment challenge regulations requiring commercial speakers
to disclose factual information, so long as the required disclosures were "purely factual and
uncontroversial," not "unjustified or unduly burdensome," and "reasonably related" to the
state interest in preventing consumer deception); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut
Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99
CORNELL L. REv. 513, 520 (2014) (noting that the law of commercial speech has been more
hospitable to speech mandates rather than restrictions).
175. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; see also Goodman, supra note 174, at 521 and
sources cited therein.
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Amendment scrutiny applied to commercial speech restrictions under Central
Hudson.1 7 6 The listener-focused justification for mandated disclosure regulation
stood in stark contrast o speaker-centered constitutional analysis protecting liberty
of self-expression in the context of noncommercial speech.1 7 7 Although, over time,
the Supreme Court became more skeptical of paternalistic regulations restricting
nonmisleading informational advertising, regulation aimed at protecting consumers
from being misled did not trigger the same concerns.178
Thus, if native ads were classed as commercial advertising and analyzed
under pre-Roberts Court commercial speech jurisprudence, then attempts to
regulate them would be subject to significantly relaxed constitutional scrutiny and
likely upheld. To the extent that the regulations were deemed to be correctives for
deceptive advertising, precedent contains language suggesting that they would not
be subject to First Amendment protections at all. 179 In any event, if the regulations
were mandated to be "factual and uncontroversial" disclosure requirements (as
opposed to speech restrictions), designed to improve information flow and protect
consumers without unduly burdening speakers, it is likely that they would pass
constitutional muster under Zauderer's rational basis review. so
To be sure, the Zauderer precedent is contested in application. 181 Neither
have the Supreme Court nor lower courts clearly established what kinds of
compelled commercial speech calls for the laxest form of First Amendment
scrutiny.182 Should the failure to disclose sponsorship in native ads be deemed
176. The underlying question of the appropriateness or viability of scrutiny
analysis in the First Amendment context is beyond the scope of this Article. However, for a
powerful critique, see C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of
Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57. See also C. Edwin Baker, Media
Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 839, 852-53 (2002).
177. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976). The justification for the regulation of commercial speech is to protect the
interests of listeners who receive information in order to make informed decisions. By
contrast, "ordinary" First Amendment doctrine (outside the context of broadcasting) focuses
on the rights of speakers. See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 170 (2015); see also Goodman, supra note 174, at
519.
178. See Berman, supra note 99, at 518-30 (discussing manipulative effect on
viewers of embedded product placement which persuades while evading critical evaluation).
179. See, e.g., Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
180. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
181. Lower courts have differed over its application when mandates are adopted
for purposes other than preventing consumer deception. See, e.g., Recent Case, Commercial
Speech - Compelled Disclosures - D.C. Circuit Applies Less Stringent Test to Compelled
Disclosures, American Meat Institute v. USDA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1526 (2015)
(canvassing range of cases).
One of the difficulties with Zauderer is that its reasoning effectively
complicated what might otherwise have been an unexceptionable conclusion that
"corrective advertising or affirmative disclosures that prevent or correct deception simply
do not raise First Amendment concerns." Goodman, supra note 174, at 523.
182. Goodman, supra note 174, at 521-22 ("Some have held that it applies only
when the government is attempting to prevent consumer deception. Others have held that it
may apply also when the government has broader informational goals. Courts have split on
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deception appropriately subject to corrective speech mandates? A narrow
interpretation of deception might lead to the conclusion that fully integrated native
ads are not improperly false and deceptive if they do not contain factual falsity. 183
Failure to identify provenance, then, might not fit the definition. Alternative
readings are possible, however. For courts that grant lenient First Amendment
review to mandated disclosure requirements beyond deception-correction, 184 the
sponsorship of stealth advertising should fall naturally into such expanded
categories. Arguably, the deception in the native ad context resides at the "meta"-
level, even in the most factually accurate native advertising content, where there is
no clear source disclosure. The product labeling that "favor[s] disclosure when
it corrects for important information deficits" 186 should include provenance
because, at a minimum, the ad's implicit assertion of approval by the news
organization indicates deception as to source.187
what kind of consumer deception counts and whether the term should have a narrow,
technical meaning. They also disagree on what the alternative to Zauderer review is:
intermediate or strict scrutiny. Commentary on the use of Zauderer in the cigarette-labeling
cases has been similarly torn."); see also id. at 539-45 (theorizing that the confusion among
the lower courts may be due to the lack of clarity in Zauderer itself, which muddied what
should have been an unexceptionable application of Virginia Board of Pharmacy); Jennifer
M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539 (2012) (describing Zauderer's ambiguities and
uncertain scope).
183. Thus, according to some, "manipulative marketing is not likely to be "false
and misleading" because it is unlikely to make factually false statements or claims. Berman,
supra note 99, at 523. While this may be true for product placement, for example, it is not
true for native advertising.
184. For a useful discussion of cases in which mandated disclosure requirements
received rational basis review even if they were not deception-corrective, see, e.g.,
Goodman, supra note 174, at 540-44; see also Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient
Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United
Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 562 (2006) (arguing that mandated
disclosures are permitted not only to correct deception, but also "to promote transparent and
efficient markets").
185. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 9 (describing how stealth marketing is
designed to mislead); see also Berman, supra note 99 (arguing that modern advertising
techniques that do not communicate information but persuade consumers at the
subconscious or emotional level should be regulable); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer
Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 114-16 (2012) (discussing
persuasive ads).
186. Goodman, supra note 174, at 538.
187. See Rebecca Tushnet, Towards Symmetry in the Law of Branding, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 971, 979 (2011); see also Tushnet, supra
note 96, at 721. Even internally factually accurate advertising is deceptive in that it rests on
brand confusion, where the advertiser captures the benefits of association with the
publisher's own brand. See Goodman, supra note 16, at 112. While, arguably, consumers
who know that a news outlet has morphed into an advertising vehicle are less likely to be
deceived, see id., the constitutional calculus cannot properly hinge on whether the audience
has developed such overall skepticism that it would not permit itself to be credulous. See
Tushnet, Towards Symmetry, supra, at 974-75 (criticizing the "unappealing consequences
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In any event, even if sponsorship disclosure rules for native ads were not
rubber-stamped under the most deferential type of constitutional review under
Zauderer, such regulations would still receive intermediate review under classic
Central Hudson commercial speech analysis if native advertising were analyzed as
commercial speech. Although Central Hudson review is less deferential than
review under Zauderer, carefully crafted regulations would arguably be deemed
constitutional if Central Hudson were deemed the appropriate analytic frame. 188
2. Under Recent Developments Affecting Commercial Speech Doctrine
Two factors create uncertainty for the application of commercial speech
doctrine here. First is the current equivocal status of pre-Roberts Court commercial
speech doctrine itself. Recent First Amendment developments suggest that the
Supreme Court is wearing away at the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech for First Amendment purposes. Arguments against
maintaining the distinctionl9 appear to be bearing fruit.190 The Roberts Court
appears to have become more attentive to speakers' interests and more skeptical of
for dynamic efficiency" of the reasonable consumer having to assume that "everybody is
lying").
Ultimately, of course, the question of what should be considered misleading
or deceptive is less a matter of technical, doctrinal argument than a normative choice
regarding the balance between autonomy and paternalism.
188. This point is descriptive only. For an exhaustive listing of scholarship
challenging the ambiguity and incoherence of commercial speech doctrine from various
vantage points, see Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1153, 1154-61 (2012).
189. For classic arguments rejecting a second-class constitutional status for
commercial speech, see, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 631-38 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Commerical Speech, First
Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 67 (2007); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591,
630-33 (1982); Rodney Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case
for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1993); Nat Stem &
Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based
Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1171-88 (2013).
190. Weinberg, supra note 173, at 8 ("It's fair to say, I think, that Central Hudson
is no longer good law."). For other descriptions of the precedent as reflecting an
increasingly protective approach to advertising under the First Amendment, see, e.g., Paul
Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 29 (2003); Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500! The
Debate over Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277,
1292 (2004); Stern & Stem, supra note 189, at 1171. Numerous scholars have decried the
recent turn to the First Amendment as a convenient and powerful "engine of constitutional
deregulation." See, e.g., Post & Shanor, supra note 177, at 167 ("The echoes of Lochner are
palpable."); Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231, 233 (2014); Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment
Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1207-09 (2015); Frederick Schauer, The
Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1614, 1616, 1629 (2015).
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what could be styled as paternalistic constraints even in the commercial context. 191
Arguably, today, interference with the speech of even nonpress corporate speakers
can be subject to the most stringent scrutiny unless it classically and predominantly
proposes a commercial transaction. In addition, the Roberts Court has significantly
extended protection for corporate speech in cases such as Citizens United. 192
Corporations as a group may well have now achieved parity with the press as to
speech, meaning that both news organizations and other sorts of commercial
entities have an increased scope of freedom of speech.
Despite these developments, scholars claim that courts have not
"abandoned the essential distinction between commercial speech and public
discourse."193 However narrowed, the commercial speech jurisprudence is still
there. If native ads are not analytically distinguishable from other content analyzed
as commercial speech, then viable arguments can still be made that regulations
would be deemed constitutional if properly structured.
3. Applicability of Commercial Speech Doctrine: Narrow or Broad
It has been argued that protecting commercial speech to the same extent
as public discourse renders democratic governance impossible. 194 The question,
though, is when to say we are engaging in commercial speech rather than public
discourse. Proponents of native advertising claim that, regardless of the state of
commercial speech doctrine, at least native ads that are primarily designed to
promote brands-rather than simply to propose particular commercial
transactions-should not be treated as classic commercial speech in the first
place. 195 They argue that such native ads deserve full-strength First Amendment
191. The freedom of the state to regulate commercial speech has been weakened
by cases such as Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). See also TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 2-12, 223 (2012) (describing
increasing protection for commercial speech against regulation under the First Amendment).
192. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 323-24, 343. On the expansion of
corporate speech rights, see, e.g., PIETY, supra note 191; Deven R. Desai, Speech,
Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455,
462 (2013); Weinberg, supra note 173.
193. Post & Shanor, supra note 177, at 174. For Dean Post's classic critique of
commercial speech doctrine, see generally Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000) (seeking to establish the distinction
between speech valued as information and as embodying democratic participation).
194. Post & Shanor, supra note 177, at 172 n.46.
195. A number of commenters at the FTC Blurred Lines workshop, for example,
took the position that editorial content paid for by an advertiser should not be considered or
labeled an ad if it does not directly promote a product or a brand. See Blurred Lines
Workshop, supra note 4, at 273-76; see also Gottfried, supra note 38, at 421 (stating that
native advertisements in endemic in-feed format "may not qualify as commercial speech"
because "editorial content outweighs the commercial qualities."). Some take an even
narrower view of native ads that should be considered commercial speech. See, e.g.,
Bohorquez & Pate, supra note 33 (distinguishing between native advertisements "with a
link directly to a promoted product or brand," and those that contain "more editorial content
than anything else").
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protection because they are pure speech or, at a minimum, "hybrid" speech
containing both commercial and noncommercial elements.196 On this view, even if
commercial speech doctrine were still intact and sponsorship-disclosure rules for
commercial speech were still subject to deferential review, the noncommercial
character of native advertising would necessitate stringent First Amendment
review. Further, if the speech were analyzed under precedent granting First
Amendment protection to anonymous political speech, then disclosure regulations
would likely be constitutionally suspect.
Doctrinally, the distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech is aporetic.197 Nontrivial arguments are being made favoring a narrow
interpretation of "commercial"-as communication that "does no more than
propose a commercial transaction." 198 This is notable because of the Supreme
Court's endorsement of corporations as speakers. At he same time, the Court has
elsewhere defined commercial speech apparently more broadly as "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience."199
Moreover, even if we could easily distinguish between archetypal
commercial and noncommercial speech in the abstract, 200 native advertising forces
us to focus on the vast middle ground of speech containing both aspects (what has
201been called "integrated" or "hybrid" speech). Much native advertising
intentionally inhabits that space-where the corporation's interest in brand identity
constitutes a more indirect commercial interest than direct offers of sale, and
For discussions of modern marketing and the differences between brand
image advertising and product informational advertising, see, e.g., sources cited in Jennifer
L. Pomeranz, Are We Ready for the Next Nike v. Kasky?, 83 U. CINN. L. REV. 203, 210-
15, 224 (2014).
196. See, e.g., Bohorquez & Pate, supra note 33; see also Desai, supra note 192,
at 487-89 (discussing Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)); PIETY, supra note 191, at 3,
223; see also Brudney, supra note 188, at 1157-61, 1204 (discussing "enriched" speech that
does more than only propose a sale transaction).
197. See Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58 S.C.
L. REV. 683, 697 (2007) (describing the Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech
as "notoriously plastic").
Proponents of heightened constitutional protection for native advertising
would claim that the contested doctrinal distinctions in current precedent for example
between speech mandates and speech restrictions, and between commercial and
noncommercial speech-cannot withstand analytic scrutiny because they are, in fact,
nothing but unhelpfully formal and manipulable categories of convenience.
198. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 776 (1976).
199. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (citations omitted).
200. Hawking particular wares for an immediate sale transaction is an easy case at
one extreme of the commercial/political divide. Corporate stands on purely political
questions in an effort to shape public opinion may be an easy case at the opposite end. See
Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope and Fear, 124 YALE L.J. 528, 544-49 (2014)
(discussing the possibility of corporate participation in democratic legitimation). A
problem, though, is that such pure archetypes are few and far between.
201. See Goodman, supra note 197, at 694-99 (describing integrated advertising
and its legal treatment).
686
2015] NATIVE ADVERTISING 687
where promotional messages are intermixed with noncommercial content.
Although the prototypical commercial message imparts information about the
product or service being offered, the new fully integrated native ad, which may not
even mention the advertiser or its products except in a small brand logo,
constitutes speech about the speaker and its views.
This is a harder issue, and one where the constitutional outcome is not as
202clear. The Court has not addressed the matter head-on. It did note, however, that
simply because a communication is an advertisement "does not compel the
conclusion that [it is] commercial speech."2 0 3 In a remarkably indeterminate hint,
the Court also distinguished between speech rendered noncommercial by the
intermingling of "inextricably intertwined" 204 noncommercial speech and speech
simply linking a product to a current public debate in order to "immunize false or
misleading product information from government regulation . . . .,,205 Almost
equally indeterminately, the Court also found "strong support" for a finding of
commerciality when the speech is a paid advertisement, promotes a specific
product, and is discernibly economically motivated.206
The difficulty is that applying these factors to native ads can rationally
lead to contrasting constitutional results. On the one hand are arguments that
native ads consisting largely of native content (rather than links for direct
purchases) should be deemed to constitute either pure editorial content, or
inextricably combine commercial with noncommercial speech.207
On the other hand, close analysis even of advertising that has been treated
as commercial speech reveals that it is often, in fact, full of noncommercial
202. One foregone opportunity was Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003), in which
the California Supreme Court appeared to have adopted an expansive definition of
commercial speech. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected Nike's appeal on
procedural and jurisdictional grounds, dismissing its writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. See also Pomeranz, supra note 195 (discussing Nike v. Kasky in light of modem
marketing practices).
As for administrative interpretations, the FTC only regulates advertising it
sees as commercial speech. In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 F.T.C. 539, 541 (Mar. 4,
1988); see also Goodman, supra note 197, at 683, 696 n.72. In dealing with native ads, the
agency looks at the "RJR factors," including whether the advertisement advances the
speaker's commercial interests and whether it speaks about specific attributes. See
Comments of Laura M. Sullivan, Staff Attorney, Division of Advertising Practices, FTC, at
ANA The Natives Are Restless Conference; see supra text accompanying note 91.
203. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (addressing
whether pamphlet promoting prophylactics should be considered an advertisement for
contraceptives violating a federal statutory prohibition of unsolicited mailing of such ads);
see also Goodman, supra note 197, at 697-98.
204. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988)
(on "inextricably intertwined" speech); Board of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 474, 475 (1989) (same).
205. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (discussing the impermissibility of merely linking a
product to a matter of public debate in order to claim noncommercial status).
206. Id. at 66-67.
207. See, e.g., Bohorquez & Pate, supra note 33.
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208speech. Whether a court will find any particular instance of commercial and
noncommercial speech to be "inextricably intertwined" will depend in large part
on whether it applies a narrow or broad definition of inextricable linkage.20 In
addition, despite the focus on the speaker's expressive message rather than the
specifics of a particular mercantile offer, there is a difference between messages
that promote a commercial reputation and positive associations with a corporate
brand, and messages that directly attempt to influence the content of public
210opinion, or weigh in on matters with no significant commercial connection to
the business or reputation of the corporate speaker.
Much native advertising that does not promote a particular corporate
product nevertheless can be described as having a fundamentally commercial
21character in two senses. 2 In one alternative, we can focus on the modern meaning
of what it means to promote a specific product. Even if a native ad does not
mention any of an advertiser's products, it can still seek to promote the
commercial aim of establishing and burnishing the reputation of the speaker or
corporate brand as a product. Thus, even though such native ads might not be
proposing a particular commercial transaction or selling a specific product directly,
208. Nike's "If You Let Me Play" ad is obviously commercial speech, but it also
contains noncommercial elements, such as statistics about the benefits of girls playing
sports. However, these noncommercial elements in the ad do not immediately transform the
speech into noncommercial speech for First Amendment purposes. See also Desai, supra
note 192, at 487-89.
209. Thus, for example, the Court found in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox that speech about home economics in a Tupperware ad
should not make the ad noncommercial because it is not "impossible to sell housewares
without teaching home economics, or to teach home economics without selling
housewares." 492 U.S. at 474. Arguably, this is an extremely narrow interpretation of
"inextricably intertwined," which makes the joined speech a necessary condition. On this
sort of interpretation, the brand association would not necessarily be in xtricably intermixed
in the endemic in-feed native ad context.
210. This is Post & Shanor's phrasing of the distinguishing characteristic. Post &
Shanor, supra note 177, at 176. Alternative phrasing might define such speech as
"perception-based promotion," rather than participating in public debate. Pomeranz, supra
note 195, at 228. Professor Piety takes the broader position that "the definition of
commercial speech should include any speech by a for-profit corporation [because] all
speech by for-profit corporations [are] inherently commercial by definition." PIETY, supra
note 191, at 224. The argument here does not extend so far. Professor Brudney foregrounds
context as the determining factor, arguing that even with "enriched" commercial speech
addressing either governance or cultural matters, the speaker intends a "transaction-
stimulating purport" and a personal benefit to the consumer, rather than alluding to matters
of public policy in order to generate true and complex engagement in the general public
interest. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1218. The conclusion is consistent with the attempt to
characterize the entire native ad as transaction-offering in this Article, although getting there
does not necessarily entail signing on to Professor Brudney's apparently wholesale rejection
of an autonomy-focused First Amendment theory.
211. Perhaps, at a minimum, we can point to differences in emphasis on the
corporate identity as opposed to the ideological point in these different kinds of messages.
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the speech is arguably still promoting a higher level or more abstract conception of
212the modern "specific product"-that is, corporate or brand identity.
In an alternative sense, even nonproduct-focused online ads are best seen
in today's online marketing context as the initial step in proposing a commercial
transaction, bringing them under the umbrella of classic commercial speech. In the
online world, the consumer is bombarded with a plethora of "push marketing," in
which sellers are madly vying with one another to induce ad-blind consumers to
notice their ads and products. Reduced consumer attention and an almost infinite
variety of claims on that attention require clever marketers to think of new ways to
distinguish themselves. One such new way is the native ad that consists of "pull
marketing"-content that intrigues a consumer to click and be brought to an
213explicitly commercial transaction. Thus, even ads that do not in themselves
contain a reference to a commercial transaction can best be seen as the first
element in a multi-step proposal of a commercial transaction. If one employs a
broad notion of commercial transaction that focuses not only on the "close," but
also on every step prior to the close, then content that merely associates a brand
with material the consumer enjoys can easily be seen as the initial commercial
"hook" in the accomplishment of the sale transaction.214
Alternatively, if the analytical focus is not on the nature and commercial
character of the transaction at issue, but on the goals of the regulation, then
arguably deference might properly be granted to well-intentioned consumer-
215protective corrective regulation. This approach, however, does not necessarily
lead to a predictable result in this context.
212. For recent articles on the practice of "unbranding," see, e.g., Cassi G. Matos,
Note, The Unbranding of Brands: Advocating for Source Disclosure in Corporate America,
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1307 (2010); Aaron Perzanowski,
Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2010); Ponte, supra
note 87; Jeremy N. Sheff, The Ethics of Unbranding, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 983 (2011).
213. See Vitaly Pecherskiy, Trends That Gave Rise to Native Advertising,
MARKETING MAG. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.marketingmag.calsponsored/trends-that-
gave-rise-to-native-advertising-142020.
214. To be sure, a narrower interpretation can be adopted as well, under which the
fact that an invitation ultimately ends in a commercial transaction does not for that reason
eliminate the noncommercial character of the initial approach when viewed in its own
terms. See Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The
Difficulty with the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 39,
75 (2013) (proposing redefining commercial transactions to include "transactions where a
company leverages consumer participation in its service as a salable good" even if the
consumer is not offered a commercial transaction); cf also Brudney, supra note 188, at
1159.
215. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 96, at 754-55 (applying a standard based on
Justice Stevens' litmus test of whether "the purpose of [the state's] regulation is consistent
with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech . . ."). Query
whether this alternative focus on government purpose for regulation is an improvement over
contested decisions about the significance of economic benefit. It is as open to similar
charges of ambiguity as the other transaction-defining approaches.
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4. The Protection ofAnonymous Speech
First Amendment protection of anonymous speech can provide an
216alternative ground for a constitutional challenge to sponsorship disclosure. This
alternative line of reasoning must be addressed even if a broad interpretation of
commercial speech were adopted, or even if a court were to find that source
disclosure is tantamount to minimally invasive regulation of the envelope in which
speech appears, rather than the content of the speech itself.
Yet protection of anonymous speech has never been absolute, and has
217been primarily geared to protecting vulnerable speakers. Mandated media
speech requiring disclosure of paid content has passed constitutional muster in the
past.21 There are credible distinctions between anonymity in the native ad context
and anonymity in the political leaflet context. 219 Perhaps most notably, the
216. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking
down a state statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature on First
Amendment grounds).
217. See C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause
Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 964 n.37 (2007); Helen Norton, Setting
the Tipping Point for Disclosing the Identity of Anonymous Online Speakers: Lessons
from Other Disclosure Contexts, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 565 (2014).
Recently, arguments have been made that the First Amendment should not
protect online anonymity in some circumstances. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89
B.U. L. Rev. 61 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Anonymity and Authority, 27 J.L. & POL.
597, 606 (2012) (discussing the costs of both anonymity and disclosure, and
particularly recognizing that the identity of a speaker provides authority and is "part
and parcel of the content of what a speaker says and of how listeners evaluate it").
Even those who make both positive and normative arguments in support of
constitutional privilege for anonymous speech, however, accept more paternalistic
reasons for permitting compelled disclosure in commercial speech contexts. See, e.g.,
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2007); see also Norton, supra
(suggesting attention to government motive, a balancing of costs and benefits, and the
nature of the contested speech).
218. See, e.g., Baker, Press Clause, supra note 217, at 964 (discussing prior
treatment of mandated disclosure); supra note 169 and sources cited therein.
219. The native ad is not the kind of anonymous speech by the kind of anonymous
speaker targeted for protection in McIntyre. McIntyre dealt with a state law that prohibited
the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. The decision protected core political
speech in an electoral context by a private individual likely to be deterred without a grant of
anonymity, and whose identity would not have added much to the content of the
communication at issue. Moreover, there was no indication that the handbill at issue was
false or libelous-a factor the Court specifically noted. 514 U.S. at 344. The Court
emphasized that "handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial
viewpoint-is the essence of First Amendment expression." Id. at 347. The Court saw the
anonymity issue in McIntyre as providing "a shield from the tyranny of the majority." Id. at
357.
In the native advertising context, the interests and incentives differ. We need
not fear the chilling effect that figured importantly in McIntyre. Indeed, one of the rationales
for reduced constitutional protection of commercial speech has been the notion that
regulation would not chill the expression of commercial advertisers. See Va. Bd. of
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skepticism-inducing element of anonymity recognized by the Court in the political
leafleting setting is absent in the native ad context. 220 The point of hidden
sponsorship in native ads is implicit misidentification rather than anonymity.221
Additionally, although the Court recognized broad corporate speech
rights in Citizens United, it also upheld disclosure as a regulatory technique even
222in the context of pure political speech during elections. The majority's reasoning
relied on a governmental interest in providing the electorate with information
about election-related spending sources in order to enable voters to make informed
223choices. The importance of source identity in that process was explicitly
224recognized. To be sure, Citizens United recognized the possibility of as applied
225challenges to disclosure laws, and scholars have warned that disclosure laws,
even in the electoral context, should have clear standards and avoid excessive
226burdens. Moreover, the sponsorship information involved in the native
advertising context does not directly concern the fundamental value of informed
voting. Nevertheless, the news consumer's ability to distinguish between paid and
editorial content is surely a critical element in promoting an informed electorate
and democratic competence. Just as the state has a compelling interest in
preventing consumer fraud, strategies that might effectively debias citizens' ability
to assess the information they use in the process of self-governance could better
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976)
(discussing the hardiness of commercial speech).
220. The McIntryre Court recognized that anonymity itself could serve as an
important cue to trigger skepticism on the part of the recipient of an anonymous
communication. 514 U.S. at 348 n. 11; see also Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid, supra note
96, at 767 n.129.
221. Such an approach is designed to suggest that someone other than the
sponsor-the news organization's editorial voice and curatorial judgment-is responsible
for the content. That is a far cry from the unpopular political speech of the unpopular
political speaker whose First Amendment and autonomy interests were recognized in
McIntyre.
Moreover, the Court in McIntyre found that mandating speaker identification
was not necessary in order to promote the state's legitimate interest in preventing voting
fraud. 514 U.S. at 349-50.
222. The Citizens United Court upheld the disclosure requirements of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA or McCain-Feingold) against a facial
First Amendment challenge. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369 (2010).
223. Id. at 371 ("This transparency enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and messages."). Even though t e
majority refused to distinguish between media and nonmedia corporate speakers, the Court
recognized that the "[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be required as a means
of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are
being subjected." Id. at 368 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792
n.32 (1978)).
224. Id. at 368 ("At the very least, the disclaimers avoid confusion by making
clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political party.").
225. Id. at 370.
226. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure
of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265,
268 (2000).
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promote democracy. Alternatively, to the extent that Citizens United is an anti-
exceptionalism case for the press, then the deployment of disclosure as an
unexceptionable regulatory technique for all corporate speech may open the door
to somewhat greater deference to deception-correcting disclosure requirements.
B. Threats to the Constitutional Status of the Press
The previous Section argued that well-crafted labeling requirements in
the native ads context are likely to be found facially constitutional if the
constitutionality of such regulations is tested through conventional commercial
speech jurisprudence. But if commercial speech doctrine declines further, or if a
court were to treat native ads as noncommercial speech, the First Amendment
might be deemed offended by such regulations. Although this might initially be
welcomed by some as a victory for free speech, it is the task of this Section to
argue that such a First Amendment "victory" would in fact constitute an important
defeat.
Regardless of scholars' differing views on the constitutionally "special"
and unique character of the press under traditional First Amendment
227interpretation, there is likely to be consensus that he Supreme Court, in
interpreting the First Amendment in most of the relevant jurisprudence, has not
historically characterized press speakers as simply fungible corporate actors
228engaging in for-profit speech. Yet several of the recent decisions of the Roberts
Court are easy to read as signaling a trend toward diminished special status for the
press.2 29 There is a nontrivial risk that the turn to native ads and the blurring of the
"church-state divide" will undermine whatever special status has been
constitutionally and otherwise attributable to the press.
Even if this is true, what impact might follow from this diminution in the
constitutional status of the press-why would it matter? 230 Would the press
necessarily lose important speech protections as a result? Which ones? Is there any
reason to believe that press corporations would not simply benefit from the speech
liberalizations applicable to all corporate speakers without significant
countervailing costs? In other words, what does the "special" role of the press (at
227. Scholars differ on the independent meaning of the Press Clause and its role
in First Amendment jurisprudence. For important discussions, see, e.g., Anderson, supra
note 19; Baker, supra note 217; Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631
(1975); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012); Sonja R. West,
Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011). However, even under
traditional free speech principles, the Court has often emphasized the signal importance of
the press to democracy. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); see also Randall
P. Bezanson, Whither Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2012); Paul
Horwitz, Institutional Actors in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REV. 809, 817
(2014); Jones, supra note 19.
228. See Jones, supra note 19; Weinberg, supra note 173, at 50-51.
229. See e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); supra notes 23, 192
and sources cited therein.
230. See Jones, supra note 19, at 268 (arguing that a diminution in the Court's
view of the press may well ead to a reduction in First Amendment freedoms in general).
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least in the rhetoric of the Court during the press's Golden Age in the Brennan
years) provide for the press? The short answer is that it both provides certain
affirmative benefits and protects the press from certain potential disadvantages.
One of the difficulties is that native advertising opens the door to
administrative review not only of the advertisement itself, but also its associated
editorial context, in order to make the assessments required by advertising and
communications law.231 Not having the "church-state" separation of advertising
and editorial means that relevant government agencies are allowed to range into
content in order to define the boundary themselves. Government agencies are
charged with the fine-grained determinations of what press content should require
supporting documentation adequate to satisfy bureaucratic evidentiary
requirements. This involves discretionary judgments otherwise left to the expertise
of editors in the ordinary press context. It effectively involves the government in
determining newsworthiness and salience. Because of the embedded context of
native advertising, advertising law can function as a de facto prior restraint on the
press's speech.
Moreover, there have been special benefits for journalism that came with
232legislative and judicial recognition of the special democratic role of the press.
Perhaps more importantly, however, it appears that the constitutional status of the
press has stayed the hand of government officials who had formal power to
regulate but chose to exercise discretion and forbear. A common recent context of
governmental forbearance toward the press is that of national security leaks.
Although government officials (especially recently) have threatened the press with
espionage prosecutions for their roles in publicizing leaked national security
233materials, and although the Supreme Court's press jurisprudence does not
clearly prohibit press prosecutions in such contexts, the special role of the press
231. Advertising law, for example, requires advertisers to substantiate factual
claims they make about products in their ads, implicitly or explicitly. Policy Statement
Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program, appended to in re Thompson Med. Co., 104
F.T.C. 648 (1984). Similarly, FCC regulations permit the Commission to determine whether
a broadcast program should be considered a program-length commercial for purposes of
assessing compliance with children's advertising rules. In re Policies and Rules Concerning
Children's Television Programming, 6 FCC Rcd 2111, 2118 (1991), recon. granted in part,
6 FCC Rcd 5093, 5098 (1991).
232. For example, the press has benefited from heightened liability standards in
certain defamation cases, see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), limits
on the ability of courts to prohibit the publication of true information, see, e.g., Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98-100, 106 (1979), judicial recognition of some
protection for newsgathering rights, see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972), and information access statutes such as
federal and state freedom of information acts, see Anderson, supra note 19, at 432; Baker,
supra note 217, at 983-84 (describing the separate meaning of Press Clause for the
protection of institutional integrity); Bezanson, supra note 227, at 1268 (cataloguing some
others).
233. See, e.g., Joanna Walters, James Risen Calls Obama 'Greatest Enemy of
Press Freedom in a Generation,' THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2014, 4:24 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/17/j ames-risen-obama-greatest-enemy-press-
freedom-generation.
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cannot but have played a significant role in government decisions not to focus on
234
the press. However, a Court inclined to discipline the press might well diminish
its status by casting it as a commercial actor whose speech and speech-related
activities are constitutionally equivalent to those of other similarly situated
235commercial speakers. Particularly in the newsgathering context, where the Court
has shown some ambivalence about journalistic activity in any event, a diminution
in the press's special reputation is likely to tip courts, legislatures, and
236administrative agencies against protection.
Furthermore, the apparent diminution in press exceptionalism at the
Supreme Court today may be accompanied by an increase in corporate speech
exceptionalism that could potentially hobble the press's ability to report on and
237oversee corporate expression and activity. In other words, it is not only that
press speech is seen as less exceptionally privileged, but correspondingly that
corporate speech may be receiving more protection than press speech in today's
topsy-turvy First Amendment climate.
Finally, the Supreme Court's attitude toward the press doubtlessly has a
trickle-down effect on lower courts.238 The less exalted the constitutional place of
journalism, the more such courts are likely to look with skepticism at press claims
of privilege of any kind or journalistic arguments for application of tort and
239
privacy law with a light touch in media cases.
234. This is not to say that the government's threats are not intended to, and do
not, chill the press. However, if First Amendment jurisprudence did not include significant
rhetoric highlighting the democratic role and significance of the press, government officials
might not be nearly as wary of prosecuting journalists whenever they could arguably do so.
235. This is not an argument about the application of commercial speech doctrine
to assess regulation of the press.
236. Of course, native advertising is not going to cause the Court to reverse
fundamental First Amendment protections that are particularly valuable for the press. At
least on the margins, however, envisioning the press as wholly commercial speakers may
well incline courts in less press-protective directions.
237. Professor Desai, for example, has recently argued that the increased
recognition of corporate speech rights under the First Amendment, when combined with
other legal protections available to corporations, makes it more difficult to criticize
corporate speakers than individual speakers. See Desai, supra note 192, at 500-01.
238. This is not to suggest that lower courts in the past have always issued press-
protective decisions in sympathy with the press-vaunting rhetoric of some Supreme Court
press jurisprudence. See, e.g., GAJDA, supra note 23, at 24-49.
239. Of course, these threats to the press are to be feared only to the extent that we
see a continuing value in a distinct Fourth Estate that imagines itself as tasked to undertake
watchdog journalism in the public interest. But what is really still special and distinct about
the traditional institutional press? See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press:
Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R. -
C.L. L. REv. 311 (2011) (discussing the networked Fourth Estate). Is native advertising
simply a consequence of the evolution of the eighteenth century Fourth Estate into the
distributed and networked media--a transformation through which everyone, whether
corporate PR hack or trained New York Times reporter, can become a journalist? Although
this raises a much bigger question than can be answered in this Article, a few observations
are in order to explain the Article's underlying assumptions about the continuing value of
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All this should make the press wary of bringing First Amendment
challenges to native advertising regulation such as sponsorship disclosure rules,
should they be governmentally mandated. Because native advertising blurs the
distinction between the press's role as public fiduciary and its role as profit-
maximizing economic actor, it stands as an invitation to courts seeking to cabin
whatever "special" role and treatment the press has been granted.240 The problem
is that even if publishers exercise self-restraint in bringing First Amendment
challenges to native advertising regulation because of their broader concern about
contributing to further diminution of press exceptionalism (such as it is),
advertisers will likely see their own interests differently. If constitutional
challenges are to come, then, they will predictably come from sponsors of native
ads rather than the news organizations themselves. It is in the news organizations'
interests, therefore, to end-run such judicial interventions by adopting self-restraint
in the native advertising context.
VI. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS
There is no perfect solution to the dilemma faced by today's news
organizations vis-t-vis native advertising, though a multi-pronged strategy could
be fruitful. First, consumer-protective labeling, the approach currently on the table
for the FTC and the industry, should not be rejected (but can be improved).
Second, a different type of transparency approach, including oversight-oriented
disclosure rules designed to protect editorial independence, could address public
debate concerns beyond consumer protection. Third, it is possible to craft a
strategy based on enlightened self-interest to nudge improved self-regulation.
promoting entities that consider themselves to be the press and engage in journalistic
functions. Not everyone in the networked Fourth Estate is a journalist, even if the output
looks like a new story. The difference lies in the editorial judgments-judgments being
made on the basis of purely financial imperatives as opposed to professional or ideological
norms. While these views may sometimes overlap, entities for which economic stakes are
the fundamental decisional factors will be more frequently and extensively subject to
pressure to compromise speech decisions. Another important quality of the press's speech is
"its independence from the government." Bezanson, supra note 227, at 1269. Further,
despite the Anderson critique, there is something to the notion that a function of the press is
not only to report news, but to be able to generate or improve accountability. That the press
is not the only participant in the public sphere able to do so does not minimize its potential
contribution on this front. A mixed media environment consisting of both the traditional
institutional press and newer forms of online journalists can serve as a mosaic to generate an
effective accountability regime. Because native advertising is prevalent in both the online
and traditional news contexts, it undermines both models' ability to aspire to fill that
watchdog role. Native advertising is important precisely because it threatens such reporting
in both the networked and legacy Fourth Estate. Whether the goal is the transparency touted
by advocacy journalists or the neutrality claimed by the traditional elite newspaper, "real"
reporters are engaged in publishing their views of the truth rather than merely seeking
commercial influence designed to enhance fleeting marketing goals. Admittedly, arguments
from expertise and professional standards are culturally contingent, and economic goals
surely motivate traditional corporate press organizations. It is important not to indulge in
excessive sentimentalism regarding the press.
240. As noted above, however, this is far from saying that the Court has
consistently granted the press full constitutional protection as such under the Press Clause.
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A. "Voice Priming": Improved Labeling to Protect Against Consumer Deception
Cognitive psychology teaches us that rapid and unconscious biases and
heuristics-System 1 cognitive processes-can significantly influence what we
think and what choices we make.2 4 1 Native advertising permits misidentification of
who is speaking, and whose voice the consumer is reading or hearing, via such a
System 1 process. It triggers, among other things, the priming effect through which
credibility associations with a respected news organization can influence a
242consumer's susceptibility to undisclosed commercial content. Ultimately, then,
"voice priming" disclosure, a disclosure that would trigger awareness that the
speaker is not the editorial voice, could facilitate a skeptical stance on the part of
the consumer of advertiser-inflected news.
Disclosure has become the preferred regulatory alternative to command-
and-control, 243 yet it is both villain and hero. Disclosure-oriented proposals
inevitably raise cognitive psychology-based critiques on their efficacy. 244
However, the type of disclosure approaches recommended here are not
245significantly subject to these objections. For example, debiasing disclosure
rules,2 4 6 present different sorts of issues than disclosures designed affirmatively to
improve decision-making or to generate fully informed consent through
241. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 25, at 19-30 (describing System 1 and
System 2 cognitive processes and their interactions).
242. This process can bypass the type of skepticism with which many people may
approach commercial appeals. To be sure, this is not to say that news consumers are not
skeptical of the content they encounter in the editorial well. But they are likely to be
skeptical about different things, such as, for example, ideological or political slant or
completeness by contrast to commercial manipulation.
243. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHER & SCHNEIDER, supra note 115, at 4-6 (describing
preference for disclosure approaches because the benefits of increased information are
assumed and disclosure seems to "regulate lightly"); Bubb, supra note 26, at 1022
(describing attractiveness of "light-touch regulatory tools like disclosure . . . ").
244, Disclosure-skeptics argue powerfully that mandatory disclosure "is a
fundamental failure that cannot be fundamentally fixed." BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 115, at 12. Some argue that disclosure can have paradoxical over-deterrent
effects. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 115 at 11; see also Calo, supra note 154, at 1012-15
and sources cited therein (describing arguments); Tushnet, supra note 96, at 764-71
(discussing Goldman argument). For criticisms of Ben-Shahar and Schneider's critique, see,
e.g., Calo, supra note 172, at 1014 ("Everyone has cognitive biases, but not everyone has
the same biases or experiences them to the same degree."); Jeremy N. Sheff, Disclosure as
Distribution, 88 WASH. L. REV. 475, 475-78 (2013).
245. Not all disclosure rules are equal, and they do not all have the same goals.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Less Than I Wanted to Know: The Submerged Issues in More
Than I Wanted to Know, JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1-12 (2014), available in draft at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2462818 (criticizing Ben-Shahar and
Schneider inter alia for ignoring mandated disclosure "intended as a corrective" for
practices that rigger biases).
246. "Debiasing" disclosures are designed to correct predictable misperceptions
or biases. For one important model of debiasing rules, see Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006). For an insightful
discussion of such debiasing disclosure models, see Bubb, supra note 26, at 1028-38.
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247
instruction. Furthermore, even if consumers would still be subject to many of
the cognitive biases hampering the ability to process the full implications of
sponsorship identification in connection with native advertising, "voice priming"
native ad labeling could at a minimum make consumers aware that they were
looking at paid-for content. And because not all consumers are alike, even in their
cognitive biases, voice-priming disclosure can be helpful for more than a marginal
percentage of those engaging with news-integrated native ads. 248
The question, then, is how to design effective voice-priming ad labeling,
especially responsive to different people's different ways of thinking. Admittedly,
there are a number of practical challenges. For example, panelists made the point
at the FTC's Blurred Lines workshop that "one size fits all" disclosure
requirements would be particularly difficult to craft for native ads, at a minimum
because of the sheer variety of native advertising models and platforms.249 We
have seen that practical questions can also be raised about the likely effectiveness
of sponsorship disclosure in the future, given empirical indications of current
consumer confusion about labeling.250 The possibility of confusion is enhanced
because of the variety of possible disclosures, depending on the type of native ad.
Underlying this is some observers' conclusion that consumers care less about
251provenance of content than whether it is true and engaging. Moreover, much of
news today is spread by reader recommendation on social media, and it is unclear
that the sponsorship labeling with which native advertising may begin at its point
of inception will necessarily travel with the material as it proliferates within social
252media. The migration to mobile is likely to put downward pressure on extensive
253disclosure as a result of reduced screen space. Enforcement questions are also
254naturally raised, particularly in view of the extent to which industry testimony at
247. See, e.g., Bubb, supra note 26, at 1023; Radin, supra note 245.
248. Cf Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 347-48 (2013).
Further, voice priming disclosure requirements do not trigger some
disclosure critics' concerns about government pushing particular controversial norms to
influence behavior. See Bubb, supra note 26, at 1036-39 (discussing the normativity and
coercive character of behavioral manipulation via effective System 1-oriented disclosure
requirements); see also Goodman, supra note 174, at 515-16 (addressing disclosure
regulations by which government seeks both to inform and influence consumers). Rather
than seeking to change consumer behavior, such a disclosure regime seeks to convey
information-a "goose" rather than a "nudge." Thus, the fact that some studies show
consumers not changing their behavior in response to disclosure of manipulation does not
undercut the use of disclosure proposed here. See Calo, supra note 154, at 1044 and sources
cited therein.
249. See, e.g., Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 215 (comments of
Zaneis).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
252. For a discussion of how downstream "socializing" of advertising content can
strip it of its disclosures, see Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 248-55.
253. Id. at 277 (comments of panelist Mudge).
254. One of the important bases of Professor Anderson's critique of Professor
Goodman's sponsorship disclosure proposal is precisely questions about enforcement. See
Anderson, supra note 31, at 8.
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the FTC's native advertising hearing indicated misunderstanding of the law of
255
deception. Finally, skeptics might ask whether, if there is a problem, advertiser
self-interest and the market would not adequately address it by generating the
256
appropriate level of disclosure without regulation. And, on the doctrinal side,
regulation may invite statutory and constitutional challenges.2 5 7
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to draft specific native
advertising disclosure rules in response to these practical difficulties, keeping the
following four factors in mind is likely to lead to an improvement over the current
situation.
First, voluntary adoption of industry standards would be feasible and
helpful. The variety of native ad formats does not preclude the development of
multiple standardized approaches to disclosure. Technology might provide one
element warranting optimism. 258 Until now, much ad blocking software has
functioned by targeting words indicative of advertising and blocking such content.
In addition to the classic explanation, the rise of ad blocking software might also
have created incentives for native advertisers to resist standardization i  disclosure
terminology. Recently, however, ad blocking technology is poised to be
supplanted by native ad labeling software.2 59 Since the appearance of AdDetect,
for example, native advertisers can be assured that the consumer's ad blocker will
not erase the ad. This removes the disincentive to standardization, and is said to
increase the incentive to improve the quality of sponsored content.260 As an
incentive to voluntary industry agreement, it would be useful to remember that
numerous administrative regulations exist under which disclosure-based regulation
arguably could be intensified by the FTC or FCC short of the adoption of new
255. Hoofnagle, supra note 101.
256. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 115 (critiquing disclosure as either ineffective
or voluntarily adopted by the market if desired by the public).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 169-240.
258. On one technological front, it is beyond the scope of this Article to address
the technical fix for the different ways in which native ad labeling can become dissociated
from the ad content itself as it travels among the multiple platforms and contexts of today's
media. To the extent, however, that one of the impediments is the terms of service of
platforms like Facebook that limit publishers' ability to include brand names when branded
content is shared from the platform, then it is not the social sharing as such that hampers the
effectiveness of the native ad disclosures. Similarly, one scholar identifies a possible culprit
in enhancing the salience of native advertising as the ranking choices made by search
algorithms that do not distinguish between native ads and editorial articles for purposes of
delivering search results. Bakshi, supra note 6, at 21. This too is not an inevitable state of
affairs.
259. See, e.g., Steven Perlberg, Meet AdDetector - The New Plug-In That Labels
Native Advertising, WALL ST. J.: CMO TODAY (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/08/20/ad-detector-native-ads/ (describing Google product
engineer's disclosure plug-in for Chrome and Firefox, which labels ponsored content with
a large red banner identifying the sponsor, but does not block the advertisement's content).
The open source plug-in can be downloaded from http://www.ianww.com/ad-detector/.
260. Id. (describing the plug-in developer's view).
698
2015] NATIVE ADVERTISING 699
rules. 261 Further, broader consensus for market correction would likely be
generated by better evidence detailing consumer reactions and providing concrete
262risk analysis of consumer trust in this context.
Second, the approach to labeling should be heavily informed by empirical
263data. There is little evidence that advertisers are currently incorporating the
insights of empirical work on human visual perception in their disclosure
264designs. With better and more extensive data, native ad design could potentially
achieve voice priming and effectively reduce consumer confusion. If the details of
disclosure more closely address human cognition and visual perception, the
disclosures are more likely to be processed properly. Empirical data can also refine
the analysis and identify those models of native ads that now present the greatest
threat of deception.265 At the same time, of course, some of the industry-funded
survey data should be assessed critically.
As part of the recommended sensitivity to empirical study, the industry's
choice of disclosure-labeling models should be influenced by socially-situated
understandings of meaning. Presumptively, labeling should be granular and
266specific to the extent possible. Language typically used to label native
advertising should be assessed for ambiguity and cultural differences in
261. For arguments that the relevant administrative agencies already have
significant regulatory jurisdiction over native advertising practices, see Bakshi, supra note
6; Gottfried, supra note 38.
262. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 298; see also supra text
accompanying notes 109-16 (describing the thinness of current data).
263. For a persuasive argument that "the right response to the important critiques
of mandatory disclosure . .. is . . . rigorous empirical assessment of which disclosures work
and which do not," see Bubb, supra note 27, at 1023.
264. See id. at 1030-33 (discussing impacts of human visual perception on
consumers' ability to process sponsorship disclosures). Native advertising industry
participants are beginning to engage in such research. See, e.g., SHARETHROUGH, A
Neuroscience Perspective: Assessing Visual Focus, Message Processing & the Ability to
Strengthen Associations Through Mobile Native Advertising (2015),
http://www.sharethrough.com/neuroscience/ (describing "a first look at what neuroscience
can teach us about creating effective native ads"). Sharethrough is a leading native
advertising automation company.
265. The agency could focus on a detailed and granular analysis of various
different native advertising techniques and their potential threat level from the vantage point
of accountability journalism. Thus, for example, the agency should focus on
recommendation widgets. See Blurred Lines Workshop, supra note 4, at 259.
266. See id. at 214 (commenter Holt's suggestion). Even if its major goal is to
correct misperceptions in consumers' System 1 attribution assumptions, neuroscientifically
grounded disclosures both of who created and paid for the placement of the content might
be useful, at least to some portion of the audience.
Admittedly, the question of who created the content becomes more complex
when it is the product of joint work by the advertiser and the publisher and particularly
when publishers bring the native ad production in-house. Nevertheless, even when
publishers create the content, it should be identified as being created for, and to satisfy the
requirements of, the brand. Otherwise, it would have been created to satisfy the independent
editorial considerations of the publisher.
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267understanding. Because disclosure terms develop standard meanings and
associations over time, it would be useful if the relevant industries developed
268consistent usages for like contexts. Consumers can be sensitized to the breadth
of cultural association of meanings over time. 269 Moreover, the advertising
industry is not the only relevant participant here; if publishers can come to some
common understandings as an industry, this will likely have some corralling effect
on brands as well.
Third, the burden should be placed on proponents of nondisclosure to
explain why there should not be a presumption that paid-for content should be
identified as such.270 The presumption of labeling for all paid-for content reduces
uncertainty and Talmudic discussions about the degree to which paid-for editorial
content does or does not actually promote products. It is also more consistent with
the notion of brand advertising, rather than mere product promotion. Particularly
when surveys reveal that consumers feel deceived if they discover camouflaged
advertising, but have good rates of engagement if even sponsored content is high
quality, native advertisers' interest is consistent with disclosure. Concerns about
quality could be addressed by collective action, especially with the intervention of
selective ad market intermediaries.2 7 1
Fourth, publishers and advertisers should consider opening their native ad
272content to public assessment and comment. For example, moderated comments
sections for native advertising content might help mitigate consumer confusion.
267. If, for example, in the culture and over time, the public has come to associate
the notion of sponsorship with mere underwriting, then it is unsurprising that consumers
might not realize that a disclosure of "sponsored content" was in fact produced by the brand
and not the media organization. Under those circumstances, simply using the terms
"sponsored by" for an integrated native ad would actually be misleading, given the previous
cultural meaning that serves as the consumer's standard for comparison. See Blurred Lines
Workshop, supra note 4, at 178, 216-18. The alternative of "sponsor generated content"
might be an improvement. See id. at 239 (describing the Wall Street Journal labeling
approach).
268. Major advertisers could agree and set the standards that would then promote
industry alignment. See id. at 218.
269. Thus, for example, truncated vocabularies for mobile device disclosure could
develop to overcome the space handicap.
270. Id. at 275-76 (noting Blurred Lines workshop panelists' differences on this
question). The IAB Native Advertising Playbook helpfully recommends that, regardless of
native advertising type, clear and prominent disclosures should apply to paid-for
advertising, even if it does not contain traditional promotional advertising messages. See
supra note 36 (citing to the document).
271. Thus, for example, it is reported that a number of high-level British
publishers have formed a consortium to engage in the algorithmic placement of native ads
in their publications. See Press Release, Guardian News & Media Press Office, World's
Leading Digital Publishers Launch New Programmatic Advertising Alliance, PANGAEA
(Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/gnm-press-office/2015/mar/18/worlds-
leading-digital-publishers-launch-new-programmatic-advertising-alliance-pangaea.
272. To the extent that the FTC chooses to enter the field, it should operate less by
command-and-control than by incentives and architecture. Creating incentives for
moderated comment sections in spaces where there is native advertising might be one such
indirect inducement.
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Inviting the wisdom of the crowd would enable publishers and advertisers to take
consumers' temperature with respect to confusion on an ad-per-ad basis. To be
sure, many news organizations are said to be reducing or eliminating their
273comments sections. Nevertheless, moderated comment areas would be much
274less likely to face such problems.
Of course, despite calls for empirically based disclosure approaches-
something like evidence-based transparency-it is often difficult to predict
whether, to what extent, and in whom such disclosures will trigger awareness and
skepticism. It is also appropriate to worry about whether the disclosure, if it works,
will lead to an excessive amount of skepticism and unduly impoverish public
discourse merely because of the commercial provenance of its content. Will the
voice priming disclosure lead to an irrational avoidance of potentially valuable
information simply because of its commercial sponsorship?2 7 5 This is why even
awareness-directed disclosure must itself be approached with a healthy skepticism
and a commitment to continuing testing.
273. Although Comments sections had been touted as a beneficial invitation to
public participation, many are being shut down because of uncivil comments. Craig
Newman, Sick of Internet Comments? Us, Too - Here's What We're Doing about It, CHI.
SUN-TIMES (Apr. 12, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://voices.suntimes.com/news/sick-of-web-
comments-us-too-heres-what-were-doing-about-it/; Dan Colarusso, Editor's Note: Reader
Comments in the Age of Social Media, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/11/07/editors-note-reader-comments-in-the-age-
of-social-media/. Studies also indicated that people would remember the comments and
somehow associate them with the newspaper's article. Ashley Anderson et al., The "Nasty
Effect": Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies, 19 J. OF
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 373 (2013); see also Dominique Brossard & Dietram A.
Scheufele, This Story Stinks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2013, at SR5. Added complexity would
be expected if native content were to be included in comments as well. See Garrett Sloane,
Ads Are Coming to the Comments Section of Publisher Sites, ADWEEK (Nov. 3, 2014,
10:23 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/ads-are-coming-comments-section-
publisher-sites-161168. Despite these problems, however, moderated-comments ections
could potentially serve a beneficial checking function, much like crowdsourcing.
274. Admittedly, one of the factors that led to public outrage over The Atlantic's
native ad puffing the Church of Scientology, see supra note 10, was that an Atlantic staffer
responded to the large numbers of negative comments generated by the piece by excising
them. See Lucia Moses, After Scientology Debacle, The Atlantic Tightens Native Ad
Guidelines, ADWEEK (Jan. 30, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-
branding/after-scientology-debacle-atlantic-tightens-native-ad-guidelines-146890. In order
to preserve the corrective and skew-revealing role potentially attributed to comments
sections here, therefore, the comment-moderating staff would require training in how to
promote such a goal for comments. The Atlantic, in response to the Scientology faux pas,
apparently adopted native advertising guidelines and limited the scope of moderator
discretion to eliminate negative comments solely on that basis.
275. This question has been raised, inter alia, by Professor Tushnet. See Tushnet,
supra note 96, at 774 (responding that people have "a metapreference for when [they are]
hearing ads . .. put[ting] source disclosure in a somewhat better position, even from an
antipaternalistic standpoint, than certain other types of disclosure . . .").
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The per-ad labeling systems discussed above are principally designed to
help consumers recognize whether, and on whose behalf, they are reading
commercial matter. However, to the extent that we want to craft a regulatory
regime (whether mandated or self-regulatory) designed to address the threats posed
by the bluffing of the "church-state divide," mere labeling requirements designed
to reduce confusion at the ad level are insufficient. If our principal worry is the
corrupting effect of advertising influence on editorial choices, we should require
those types of disclosures from news organizations as would be useful in
identifying, revealing, and quantifying the risk of such corruption. Thus, a
disclosure regime focused on detailed disclosure of each news organizations'
commercial advertising funding would help support public oversight of how well
news organizations are policing their advertising/editorial boundaries.
The alternative type of disclosure regime recommended here would be
designed to ferret out circumstances particularly raising the specter of advertiser
influence over editorial decisions. 277 One such oversight-focused disclosure
requirement would lead news organizations to disclose the identities (and/or the
industries/types of products or brands) of their major advertisers and the
percentage of advertising revenues attributable to such advertisers. At a minimum,
the disclosure could focus on the advertisers placing native advertising. The
disclosure requirements would have to be tailored to address, to some degree, the
historical as well as current advertising relationship with the news organization.
They would also have to account for the likelihood of future increases in
advertising by the brands at issue on any given outlet for at least the near-term
future. Moreover, the disclosures would have to be publicly available, and in forms
amenable to comparative analysis, so that a contextual assessment across
publishers could be made. Thought would have to be given to enforcement and
inducements to comply. 278
Given media concentration, disclosure requirements hould apply at the
corporate level and not merely at the level of particular stations, newspapers, or
online news providers. On the basis of this kind of information, and in light of the
news organizations' coverage over given periods of time, private watchdog groups
276. Professor Menell has suggested an alternative approach, focused on taxation.
Thus, he suggests a modest tax on embedded advertising (the proceeds of which would be
used to fund consumer education) or the elimination or scale-back of tax deductibility of
advertising expenses. Menell, supra note 55, at 817. Professor Goodman's Stealth
Advertising adverted to, but did not extensively discuss, corporate disclosure. Goodman,
supra note 16, at 151.
277. It is unclear from Professor Goodman's proposal for the expansion of the
FCC's sponsorship identification requirement whether media should be required to disclose
not only the fact of sponsorship, but also the identity of those who paid for the advertising.
See Anderson, supra note 31, at 6 (making this point); cf Adam Candeub, Transparency in
the Administrative State, 51 Hous. L. REV. 385, 404 (2013) (describing government
transparency as "about revealing influence in order to limit corruption . . .").
278. Such disclosures would "put[] private intermediaries in a position to fortify
official enforcement regimes ..... Goodman, supra note 16, at 151.
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might question publicly the degree of influence various advertisers might have on
the news organizations' editorial judgment.
Second, a related type of oversight-enabling disclosure requirement
would focus on the production aspects of native advertising. Thus, one possibility
might be requiring news organizations to disclose which, or at least what
percentage of, their native ads were produced by their brand advertising producers
in-house. Another would require the news organizations licensing their editorial
content to disclose the kind and percentage of such licensing in which they engage.
The intuition underlying these suggestions is that news organizations are
more likely to compromise their editorial judgments for major advertisers (or those
brands they are courting to become major advertisers in the near term), and when
they know that the advertisers have quivalent alternatives to which they can turn
if their demands are not met. Media watchdog groups, armed with the news
organizations' advertiser breakdowns, could more effectively assess the likelihood
of advertiser influence at any given time.
This approach is, of course, far-from-perfect. After all, it relies on proxies
and probabilities of influence-very indirect matrices from which to infer
causative conclusions. It requires inevitably arbitrary decisions regarding
disclosure thresholds. There is no objective, principled ground by which to identify
the percentage of advertising revenue that should be deemed as the threat
threshold-5%? 10%? 20%? More? Under whose auspices would such a scheme
be administered? How would the information be publicized? Depending on the
details, such a disclosure regime could potentially force the harmful revelation of
proprietary information to competitors. It could even invite the creation of a media
watchdog establishment with an institutional bias for finding editorial skew in
virtually every major ad-supported news organization.
Given the fluidity, subjectivity, and contextual character of news
judgments, it is likely that watchdog groups with different news values and
ideological commitments will always be able to look to disclosed advertising
information to justify their assertions of advertiser bias in a news organizations'
editorial choices. We have already seen this in the current landscape, with both
right- and left-wing complaints about media bias in the traditional news arena. An
advertiser-disclosure requirement might well revive and further legitimate such
claims, even if the differences are ideological rather than a result of advertiser-
prompted corruption. Further, as has previously been argued in an analogous
context, enforcement of such sponsorship rules would doubtlessly "present some
difficulties."2 79
Nevertheless, disclosure of major advertisers has the benefit of focusing
analysis at the institutional level, rather than the granular, ad-by-ad level. It at least
provides the possibility that public discourse will focus on the dangers of
embedded advertising to news content and editorial integrity. While the triggering
percentages will inevitably be subject to dispute, most would probably agree on
the relational salience of the selected metrics. It is likely that a news platform
279. Anderson, supra note 31, at 6 (criticizing Goodman's proposed sponsorship
disclosure model on such grounds).
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would be less likely to compromise its news judgments over a 5% advertiser that
has not varied in its advertising buys for the previous decade as opposed to a brand
accounting for 25% or more of the platform's advertising revenue. And even if
ideologically motivated watchdog groups could use the disclosed information in
support of their own media bias campaigns, the availability of hard revenue
information would enable more factually grounded claims about declines in
editorial independence.
Although we can complain about the political bias of those news
organizations that do not reflect our own political views, and although we are all
aware that news judgment can be skewed by all kinds of factors, including
reporters' political outlook, professionalism, intellectual capacity, work ethic,
social circle, and source pool, we nevertheless bridle in particular against
revelation that news organizations have compromised their (admittedly otherwise
280fallible) professional news judgments for advertising dollars. We expect
editorial independence from ammon, if not from the other cognitive and social
2811biases to which people are prone.
Perhaps most realistically, the need to comply with such a disclosure
regime might force the news organizations themselves to face the problem of
possible influence. A newspaper's own reporters, armed with this advertiser
information, can challenge content decisions that appear to them to be unduly
deferential to major advertisers. The fact that the news organization has the burden
of justifying its news coverage, particularly if it has significant and publicly-
disclosed advertising relationships with particular brands, could create the
occasion for its own internal institutional assessments of the impact of such
advertising on its own news brand and reputation. The need to comply with a
disclosure regime might therefore serve as a practical nudge.
Finally, public companies already provide some of this information to
some constituencies voluntarily. Thus, for example, the New York Times revealed a
significant amount of information about the economics of its Paid Post venture in a
presentation to investors earlier this year. Of course, the degree of detail
provided will predictably vary among organizations. Even news outlets with a
penchant for transparency will in all likelihood stop short of making all the
relevant information available publicly. Nevertheless, that some financial
information will likely be voluntarily disclosed, at least by public companies, is a
step in the right direction.
280. See id. at 3.
281. See id. at 1-2 (agreeing with such a view of news consumer expectations);
Baker, supra note 217, at 958-70 (discussing institutional integrity).
282. See Michael Sebastian, Native Ads Were 'Inside' 10% of Digital at the New
York Times Last Year, Publisher Now Pursuing More Creative Work, ADVERT. AGE (Feb.
3, 2015), http://adage.com/article/media/york-times-sold-1 8-2-million-worth-native-
ads/296966/. The article recounts the executive vice president of advertising at the New
York Times telling investors that Paid Posts comprised "inside 10%" of the company's
digital ad revenue in 2014, or up to $18 million dollars of native ads. She revealed that Paid
Posts had "a lot of demand," and that approximately 40 brands bought paid posts in 2014,
with 50 campaigns running on the New York Times' website and in its mobile apps. Id.
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C. Strategies to Promote Effective Self-Regulation
The third proposal is an attempt to promote enlightened corporate self-
interest through collective action. As such, it engages in revealing and realigning
incentives. One might wonder whether effective self-regulation in this space is
283realistic. Skepticism is natural at least in part because financially strapped news
organizations cannot afford to take the high road on native advertising if their
competitors are actively engaging in the practice. They face structural incentives to
minimize the risks and overplay the benefits. What might be useful, then, is
devising strategies that will create incentives for collective resistance to those
284structural incentives. But such collective action is highly unlikely unless
arguments in its favor are directed not only to publishers, but also to other
important stakeholders. If the variety of participants-publishers, advertisers,
media lawyers, ad industry and journalism trade associations, and scholarly
researchers in the area-can be convinced that effective self-regulation by news
organizations will be in everyone's long-term self-interest, then workable models
285are more likely to emerge. The task, therefore, is to persuade the players that
effective self-regulation of native advertising is a "win-win" alternative for both
news organizations and advertisers.
A lynchpin of the strategy of persuading news organizations to recalibrate
their perceived balance of self-interest vis-t-vis native advertising is to make them
face the likely institutional and doctrinal costs of an unhesitating, wholesale
commitment to native advertising. It is important for all, or at least mainstream,
news organizations that rely on native advertising to recognize the extent to which,
by conspicuously bluffing the traditional line between advertising and editorial
content, they are inviting potentially catastrophic doctrinal and institutional
286consequences for all news organizations. And at least those culturally concerned
283. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 16, at 137-41 (arguing why markets are not
sufficient and mandatory sponsorship disclosure regulations are necessary).
284. This is not the kind of collective action that would likely trigger antitrust law
concerns.
285. Admittedly, self-regulatory approaches in the advertising context have
prompted significant critique. See, e.g., Dale Kunkel et al., Solution or Smokescreen?
Evaluating Industry Self-Regulation of Televised Food Marketing to Children, 19 COMM. L.
& POL'Y 263 (2014) (criticizing self-regulation with respect to food marketing to children);
Villafranco & Reilly, supra note 85 (noting limits on effectiveness of self-regulation by
NAD). For broader critiques of self-regulation in the communications context, see, e.g.,
Angela Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711 (1999). At the
same time, arguments have been made supporting the benefits of self-regulation through
organizations such as the NAD. See, e.g., Peeler, supra note 87, at 444-45. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to moderate that debate. It is enough to note for purposes of the
proposals here that they do not raise all the concerns articulated in the critiques of self-
regulation in the advertising space. The point of the strategy proposed here is to get the
various stakeholders to see the alignment of their incentives. Cf Calo, supra note 154, at
1022-24 (characterizing behavioral economics as problem solving via realigning
incentives).
286. See, e.g., Colhoun, Disguising Ads, supra note 8 ("[D]isguising ads ... likely
lowers the credibility of an outlet.").
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with professional standards and the democratic role of the press will be concerned
that their activities will directly degrade the communicative environment and
287public discourse.
This is not to suggest that these institutions are somehow too
unsophisticated to recognize such threats.288 Rather, the problem is that they are
constrained by three factors: the reality that desperation and competition
concentrate even the institutional mind on immediate solutions, the fact that
decision-making in hierarchical organizations is often in the hands of those with
short-term economic horizons, and the possibility that the media bar has led the
press to an unduly sanguine view of its constitutional protections.
Because publishers are not confronted with ineluctable evidence about the
tarnishing impact of native advertising on news brands, decision-makers can
conveniently respond to immediate market needs-and their competitors'
actions-without considering the long view. Yet the mid- and long-term
reputational impact on news organizations is only now starting to be studied,2 89
and the long view suggests that, over time, insufficiently transparent native
advertising appears to erode reader trust in the news sites themselves.290
Admittedly, the threat may be less of a concern right now for digital-native
hybrid news sites online (such as BuzzFeed), whose readers may know exactly what to
expect. On the other hand, to the extent that such hybrid sites evolve into more mainstream
news outlets, their interests too are likely to align with those of the traditional news
organizations. See also Tushnet, supra note 187, at 9 (discussing the inefficiency of
generalized consumer skepticism). And reputation is the key to consumer acceptance of
mixed hard news and "audience-pleasing frivolity." Ann Friedman, Why Serious Journalism




287. Goodman, supra note 16, at 112-13 (discussing the nature of the threat).
288. Of course, the concern about native advertising harming the news
organization's own brand is not news to the publishers themselves. After all, it was the Wall
Street Journal's editor who warned of the dangers of native advertising as a "Faustian pact"
in 2013. Pompeo, supra note 1 (quoting Wall St. Journal Editor Gerard Baker).
289. See Patrick Howe & Brady Teufel, Native Advertising and Digital Natives:
The Effects of Age and Advertisement Format on News Website Credibility Judgments, 4
INT'L SYMP. ON ONLINE JOURNALISM 78, 79-81 (2014) (reviewing the sparse literature); but
cf James T. Cole II & Jennifer D. Greer, Audience Response to Brand Journalism: The
Effect of Frame, Source, and Involvement, 90 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q., 673, 674
(2013) (describing the dearth of academic research on how audiences react o custom
magazines). The Tow Center and the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford
are apparently planning to survey 2000 respondents per country in the United States and
Europe "creating one of the broadest analyses about credibility." Colhoun, Disguising Ads,
supra note 8 (quoting Tow Center fellow). The Tow/Reuters study designers expect to see
consumers "lose trust in the host news organization." Id.
290. Of the relatively small number of studies available, even those produced on
behalf of the advertising industry suggest a negative effect on credibility. For example, a
recent study of people's attitudes toward native advertising revealed that while brands
benefit from appearing on highly trusted media sites, 62% of study respondents said that the
native ads did not help the reputations of the news sites. IAB Study, supra note 104; see
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Although one might think that this concern about news organizations'
own brand integrity would be dispositive, one of the constraints here is the limited
view of many of the corporate executives and managers charged with funding
decisions for news organizations. Many such institutions today are publicly held
corporations. The short term horizon is often a consequence of executives' desire
to show short-term gains to their shareholders in such ownership structures. By
contrast to the future-focused reputational incentives that actuated many of the
family-owned newspaper dynasties of the twentieth century, 291 newspaper
management today is most interested in (and judged by) short-term economic
results. Current executives' incentives to show short-term hikes in share prices
thus do not factor in longer term institutional harms.
Revealing the longer-term harms might promote a more complex
risk/return strategy and a more nuanced deployment of native advertising. But how
could that be accomplished, if short-term decision-making is rational in the current
press structure? First, if the news organizations were to act collectively,
competitive advantage would not be as driving a factor, and the executives' share-
price-focused decisions would not need to be so risk-taking. Second, even if a
corporate decision-maker has the ultimate decisional responsibility in any given
situation, institutional decisions often straddle conflicts within different
participating parts of institutions. If the true costs of an uncritical native
advertising strategy are made clear, institutional participants (such as professional
292journalists and editors) can put pressure on the business executives. They can
use publicity and the threat of public shaming to do so. Nudging pressure under
those sorts of circumstances might well tip the balance of power among
contending groups. Similarly, debt-holders and even some shareholders can seek
also, Tom Foremski, Study on 'Native Advertising' Finds Benefit for Brands, Risks for
Publishers, ZDNET (July 24, 2014, 4:12 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/study-on-
native-advertising-finds-benefits-for-brands-risks-for-publishers/ ("The study shows that
media companies carry a far higher risk to their reputation and value perception in allowing
native advertising than their brand advertisers."). Although business news and entertainment
news sites were seen as less problematic, general news sites running native ads exposed
their publishers to reputational risk. Id. While the IAB Native Advertising Playbook
recommended on the basis of these findings that publishers "walk away from advertisers
who aren't relevant/trusted," that is a recommendation that would be very difficult to
effectuate consistently. IAB Study, supra note 104. It is also silent on the deeper reasons for
distrust. Most of the few scholarly studies, while not conclusive, also suggest negative
credibility effects for the news publishers. See, e.g., Elisabeth Clark, Research Shows
Readers Lose Trust with Native Advertising. Is the Revenue Worth It?, INMA (Aug. 24,
2014), http://www.inma.org/blogs/value-content/post.cfm/research-shows-readers-lose-
trust-with-native-advertising-is-the-revenue-worth-it. Admittedly, a recent article reporting
the results of a small study concluded that the negative impact on credibility expected by the
authors was not in fact bome out by their results. Howe & Teufel, supra note 289. However,
as Professors Howe and Teufel admit, there are a number of limitations to their study. Id. at
87.
291. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY
OWNERSHIP MATTERS (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2007) (noting differences between
family and corporate-owned newspapers).
292. Cf Plunkett & Quinn, supra note 122.
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more accountability from management with respect to long-term risks of an "all-
in" native advertising strategy.293
Ironically, the media bar may be another of the blind spots for news
organizations. So, an additional strategy to promote collective action by news
organizations would be to direct attention to their lawyers' recommendations.
Professor Amy Gajda has described the breadth, and "knee-jerk" character, of the
First Amendment arguments made today by media lawyers for the full range of
speakers and publishers. 294 Such confidence in the protections of the First
Amendment is already quite questionable, even without the complicating factor of
295native advertising. When that element is factored into the picture, such news
organizations might have to become less sanguine concerning their constitutional
and other special protections. To the extent that a rosy, backward-looking First
Amendment world-view stops the media bar and its press clients from realistically
facing the possibility of the loss of important institutional leverage and First
Amendment protections, the publishers may not adequately recognize the need to
check a headlong rush into the current model of native advertising. Further
complicating the analysis is the increasing extent to which lawyers for technology
companies are envisioning and "shaping the future of free expression
worldwide." 296
293. One can question whether shareholder involvement on these issues is either
likely or desirable. The reality of the ownership of public corporations today, by and large,
is that stock is not held for very long periods of time by the stockholders. Even if influential
institutional stockholders (such as hedge funds) have been shown to be not as "short term"
in their investments as had originally been supposed, their stockholding horizon is not
generally a multi-year investment. In any event, even if some of the institutional
shareholders (pension funds, labor unions and the like) might be disposed to consider the
nonmonetary issues, the majority of shareholders are likely to focus on the short term share
price. This is not the end of the story, however. Although this is, of course, subject to
falsification by empirical study, it seems reasonable to assume that bondholders and others
holding news organizations' debt would have longer time horizons and a potentially greater
interest than current managers and even current shareholders in the future financial risks
facing their firms.
It is, of course, troubling to suggest anything remotely resembling
shareholder or debtholder control over journalistic content decisions. However, that is not
what is being proposed here. If persuasive data bout the threat of native advertising to
news organizations' own credibility were publicized, there would be some stakeholders
with an interest in the long term impact of risky decisions with short term benefits. The
executive decision-makers would not be the only voices. These stakeholders could provide
push-back against media executives' short-term economic decisions. Rather than censoring
the news organizations, these participants would be promoting editorial independence and
credible journalism.
294. See GAJDA, supra note 23, at 192-221 (noting, and criticizing, the media
bar's calls for absolute First Amendment protection of any and all press activities).
295. Jones, supra note 19, at 271; GAJDA, supra note 23, at 2-3.
296. See generally Ammori, supra note 168. Not only are such lawyers
representing commercial entities with more mixed economic and expressive interests than
traditional stand-alone media organizations, but they are also likely to be more focused on
Internet service provider immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
and transnational aw regarding expression, than on the First Amendment. See id. at 2262-
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In addition to arguments directed at publishers, it could be useful for
advertisers themselves to recognize the benefits of advertising on news venues
with continuing high credibility. From one point of view, it could be said that, at
any given moment, there may be little economic reason for an advertiser to care
about the future reputation of the publisher. This is particularly true if the
advertiser has other avenues through which to reach the customer demographic of
choice.297 The problem, however, is that advertisers will still have to advertise
somewhere. And the established news organizations are still better venues than
striking out entirely on their own.298 For example, a recent study of U.S. internet
traffic to 26 of the top news websites concludes that, although Facebook and
search engines "are critical for bringing added eyeballs to individual stories ...
[and do so] in droves," direct visitors to a news site have a higher level of
engagement-spend much more time, view many more pages of content, and
return more frequently-than visitors referred by a search engine or Facebook.299
In addition, to the extent that people access the news via apps on mobile devices,
the move to mobile is likely to increase news organizations' (rather than Internet
intermediaries') control over news content. Moreover, if the brands leave the news
sites because they can no longer obtain the reputational benefit of association with
the news organization's brand, they will move to Facebook or other social media
in order to disseminate their messages. But Facebook, with its own economic
interests and its terms of service, will not necessarily be more hospitable to the
brands than the news venues. Thus, it might persuasively be argued to advertisers
that even news organizations with high-level standards for native advertising
would in fact be more beneficial to advertiser self-interest than direct advertising
by the brands via intermediated social media.
When information about native advertising in the news space is broadly
publicized on a real-time basis, institutions that have more at stake in terms of
power and authority might well perceive the benefits of attempting to control the
behavior of their competitors. After all, if native advertising by some push-the-
envelope publishers casts the entire commercial journalism sector into disrepute,
those with the more balanced approaches should have incentives to act
collectively. If the news publishers with well-received brands can be convinced, on
the basis of robust empirical data, that native advertising will tarnish their own
brands, then they will have incentives to engage in collective self-regulation. And
if such a move takes place collectively, then the competitive gaming problem is
63. Less exclusively focused on the First Amendment-a "local ordinance" interpreted by a
"local tribunal," id. at 2263-lawyers for these companies may constitute a counterweight
to the remaining traditional media bar. This too raises concerns, at a minimum of the
pendulum swinging too far in the other direction.
297. See Meyer, supra note 9 (describing direct engagement between brands and
customers via brand journalism unmediated by media).
298. There are limits to the effectiveness and scope of direct communications by
brands on their own sites or on Facebook at this time.
299. Amy Mitchell et al., Social, Search and Direct: Pathways to Digital News,
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2014), http://wwwjournalism.org/2014/03/13/social-search-
direct/.
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reduced. Ethics codes or rules are likely to gain more adherents when ews
300
organizations see their interests as common.
Even if some outliers do not comply with such a self-regulatory regime,
the "reputable" and independent news brands can use the distinction to
differentiate their own brands further. Something like a "Good Housekeeping seal
of approval" for independence and credibility could add monetizable brand cachet
to the mainstream news organizations participating in the collective self-regulatory
experiment.
What kind of collective self-regulation might result from this process of
facing the dangers of native advertising? The specifics are hard to predict, but one
simple answer is the development of-and more consistent adherence to-ethics
codes addressing native advertising for both journalistic organizations and
advertisers. On the advertising side, the online advertising industry has already
issued guidance recommending a meaningful degree of sponsorship disclosure.
The goal there is to promote compliance with that guidance by brands, which
would be more likely to occur if NAD takes the guidance seriously. On the
journalistic side, a common self-regulatory model has not yet emerged.301 Newly
developing, hybrid forms of digital journalism are said to require "a more
streamlined, contemporary set of editorial standards that fit the Internet era."3 0 2
The Online News Association ("ONA"), the world's largest trade organization of
digital journalists, is formulating new editorial standards in a "do-it-yourself'
303ethics code. The International Chamber of Commerce has issued guidance on
native advertising emphasizing sponsorship identification. 304 The Society of
Professional Journalists could profit from looking at the variety of principles under
300. A helpful self-regulatory approach seeking to foster editorial integrity would
ensure that news organizations' native advertising policies and ethical rules would be
drafted by the editorial (and not the sales) staff and heavily publicized.
301. What was there-for example, the ethics code of the American Society of
Magazine Editors-was unrealistically prohibitive of native advertising and therefore
unlikely to be widely followed. See AM. Soc'Y OF MAG. EDITORS, ASME Guidelines for
Editors and Publishers (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.magazine.org/asme/editorial-
guidelines. The ASME guidelines, if read strictly, appeared effectively to prevent native
advertising integrated into news sites. As a result, ASME recently changed and liberalized
its rules, although its principle "don't deceive the reader" still remains central. See Michael
Sebastian, Magazine Trade Group Overhauls Advertising Guidelines, ADAGE (Apr. 15,
2015), http://adage.com/article/media/asme-dramatically-overhauls-guidelines-advertising/
298053/.
302. Riordan, supra note 130, at 3.
303. Id. at 9. The mix-and-match approach consisting of a baseline of mandatory
principles for all digital journalists, with additional optional ones tailored to the character of
the specific outlet.
304. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMM'N ON MKTG. AND ADVERT., ICC
Guidance on Native Advertising, Doc. No. 240-712 (2015),
http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-centre/2015/ICC-Guidance-
on-Native-Advertising/; but cf Damaris Colhoun, Tracking Your Every Online Move,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Feb. 18, 2015,
http://www.cjr.org/behind-thenews/nativeadusertracking.php (describing a recent BBB
warning that companies marketing via native advertising and engaging in online tracking
must comply with the BBB's privacy code and alert them to the tracking).
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which different news organizations are currently structuring their native
advertising and distill best practices not only for labeling, but for reinforcing the
"church-state" separation i organizations with changing internal structures.3 05 The
negotiated compliance agreements included in recent FCC Consent Decrees with
licensees that violated commercial sponsorship rules might also prove fruitful.306
Importantly, the work of the journalistic and ad industry trade associations would
benefit from proceeding each with reference to the other.
We must, of course, address the risk that such self-regulatory initiatives
could turn out to be little more than illusory solutions. Why should we believe that,
instead of the development of collective-transparency norms, news organizations
would not engage in collusive activity in order to prevent revelation of stealth
campaigns? After all, if consumers do not in fact realize that they have been
deceived as to source, the news organizations should not be subject to a credibility
307drop. Or, even if codes of conduct have been adopted, what is to stop some
news organizations and advertisers from engaging in gaming strategies to avoid or
limit compliance?
Ultimately, there is no way to answer this question with certainty.
Whether the experiment is worthwhile will depend on one's view of the relative
likelihood of a good-faith self-regulatory process.3 08 Two interconnected factors
should be considered in that assessment: the professional journalistic norms and
305. The recently revised SPJ Code of Ethics relevantly provides as follows:
"Deny favored treatment to advertisers, donors or any other special interests, and resist
internal and external pressure to influence coverage. . . . Distinguish news from advertising
and shun hybrids that blur the lines between the two. Prominently label sponsored content."
Soc'Y OF PROF'L JOURNALISTS, SPJ CODE OF ETHICS (Sept. 6, 2014),
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp.
306. For example, KTNV-TV in Las Vegas settled a sponsorship ID violation
case with the FCC in return for the payment of $115,000 and agreement to effectuate a
"compliance plan" in 2014. See Press Release, Fed. Comms. Comm'n, Journal Broad. Corp.
to Pay $115,000 Penalty for Airing Paid Ads Posing As Station's Special Reports, (Dec. 5,
2014), https://www.fcc.gov/document/ktnv-tv-pay-115k-violation-sponsorship-id-rules; see
also Weiss, supra note 83 (describing the case). The Compliance Plan would require the
appointment of a Compliance Officer, adoption of a detailed Compliance Plan and
Compliance Manual, education of sponsors with respect to sponsorship ID requirements,
and a series of reports to the FCC and the licensee's Board of Directors.
307. Or if all the news organizations are corrupt (or at least all engaging in native
advertising), then would a drop in credibility across the board really have an impact as a
practical matter? This is the easier objection. Consumers will not assess all news
organizations as equally culpable with respect to deception. And it is unrealistic to think that
the hidden will not, at some point, be revealed. The longer the deception, the more furious
the customer.
308. For points of view skeptical of self-regulation, see, e.g., Colhoun, Victor
Pickard, supra note 97; Bakshi, supra note 6, at 22. As for Professor Margaret Jane Radin's
broader warnings about the democratic degradation that can accompany private
standardization and formal disclosure in contracts, namely "mass-market deletion of rights
to meaningful redress of grievances," Radin, supra note 245, at 14, native advertising is
precisely one context in which private-press industry agreements for self-restraint could
forestall democratic degradation by deterring advertisers from applying to the courts to
constitutionalize silence in the service of purely commercial interests.
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culture of the news organizations, and the existence of a journalistic cadre that can
serve as a constituency holding the publishers to their commitments. The
assessment of whether regulation could realistically be in the offing, via
adjudication even if not rulemaking, is also relevant. These elements do not
necessarily lead to a single reassuring conclusion, of course. Given the financial
difficulties facing publishers, journalists afraid for their jobs may not stand
together to put pressure on publishers. Given how slowly both legislative and
administrative wheels grind, the shadow of potential regulation might not lead to
much bargaining among the regulated. And given changes in news culture and
practices, traditional norms might not prevail against participants who see some
value in collaborations across the commercial/editorial divide. Still, this Article
supports taking the leap of faith that most news organizations, at least of the more
traditional sort, would sincerely attempt to keep faith with their professional roles,
so long as their competitors did not make that impossible. An experiment in
collective action could help ensure that.
CONCLUSION
The digital news landscape presents unprecedented challenges for news
organizations. The traditional business model that sustained newspapers during the
twentieth century is dead. Instead, innovative advertising techniques have
developed as replacements. Most of these modern techniques involve disguising
commercial advertising by seamlessly integrating it into editorial content, both in
entertainment and in news venues. Everyone is said to win with such marketing:
consumers by having access to valuable and interesting content rather than
irritating ads, advertisers by having satisfied customers whose brand loyalty they
can build and whose browsing experience they can mine for information, and news
organizations by finally being able to halt the existential financial crisis they have
faced for the past decade.
The problem, however, is that the cure may be worse than the disease,
particularly with respect to "stealth advertising" in news contexts. The transitory
financial bump of native advertising will ultimately pale in light of the harm to the
credibility of news organizations from their lemming-like foray into native
advertising. It is particularly troubling that news organizations are themselves
producing such advertising content in-house and leasing their editorial content to
be used for marketing by brands. Thus, not only does the new fad of native
advertising pose significant threats of consumer confusion and deception, but it
also presents deeper and broader dangers to the editorial independence and
unbiased news judgment to which we aspire, and to the legitimacy, power, and
democratic centrality of the press as an institution.
So what is to be done? Expecting financially ailing news organizations to
reject native advertising at the very moment of its increasing profitability and
popularity is unrealistic. This means that proposed solutions must be crafted from
the vantage point of the second best. Three approaches have been suggested in that
spirit. First, and contrary to the arguments of disclosure-skeptics, there is little
reason to abandon transparency in ad labeling as a goal so long as the labeling
rules are crafted with a view to robust empirical support. Second, additional
benefits designed to enable oversight of how news organizations are
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operationalizing native advertising can be gleaned from corporate-level disclosures
about the news organizations' advertisers and ad content production relationships.
Third, despite structural roadblocks to collective self-regulation by news
organizations presenting native advertising, persuasive strategies are available to
enhance recognition of aligned interests by advertisers, news organizations, trade
associations, and media lawyers. These solutions seek to promote-although,
regrettably, they cannot guarantee-a diverse Fourth Estate that encourages
accountability journalism.
